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CHINA'S STRATEGY TOWARDS GWADAR PORT AND INDIA-US NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE REGION

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Abstract
China is largely dependent on oil imports from Middle East via sea routes. Various choke points seriously effects the trade particularly Strait of Malacca. Provision of security to the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) has emerged as a major challenge for China in the Indo-Pacific region. The presence of India-US Naval powers in the region alongside Strait of Malacca being comparatively longer route posses a serious challenge for China in particular. The core intent of this paper evaluates the emerging Indo-US Naval existence in the Indo-Pacific region. The presence of Indo-US naval power in the Indo-pacific is a potent threat to Chinese shipping and it would also affect China's strategic interest in Gwadar port. The purpose of my paper is to investigate the connection that has grown between the United States and India in the Indo-Pacific area and the strategic significance of Gwadar Port since the turn of the century, as well as the reasons for their construction of a quad-alliance in this region. In contrast, china needs the best alternate route in regards to Strait of Malacca and that is Gwadar port situated in Pakistan. China's trading through Gwadar port is not only a risk-less route but more shorter than Strait of Malacca.

1. INTRODUCTION

The India-US Navies has keen presence along the strategic Malacca channel as of where a volume of Chinese vigor goods bypass through, with sources saying warships as well as airplane have been deployed. Sources said that while steps were taken to ensure on the Chinese navy's intention in the area after the conflict, the Chinese side has been engaged in the South China Sea with current assets.

As we know that US has more rely on her navy than their other forces i-e Air force and Army, and US has been deployed 60% of their navy in Malacca strait just for the blockage of Chinese shipment in the Malacca strait. On the other hand India is the strategic partner of America and support the American presence in Malacca strait for the stoppage of Chinese shipping in the region. US is doing bilateral security agreements (BSA) with littoral states, for instance Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, Philippines and Japan for the purpose of capacity buildings, US has provided war weapon to the above mentioned states for the creation of hurdles to Chinese shipment in Malacca strait.

Given the fact that China is embroiled in disputed territories with its neighbors inside the South China Sea, the United States has created a conducive atmosphere for collaboration and coalition building against China in the area. It strengthened its interaction with countries in Southeast Asia. Although Japan has long been a critical ally of the United States, India has recently evolved as a more ideal relationship in the Asia-Pacific area, according to the US Department of State.

Whenever we see that if India or USA blocks the Strait of Malacca for Chinese shipping then china should search for the best alternate to run her trade, and that is Gwadar Port Pakistan in Arabian Sea. There are numerous advantages for china while using Gwadar Port, for instance;

- In accumulation its importance, it will significantly reduce China's reliance on the Strait of Malacca as well as south China Sea routs.
- Gwadar port will provide China with a more convenient and quicker route for importing energy from the Middle East.
- Gwadar offers the shortest route__ approximately 2500km compared to nearly 10000km via the strait of Malacca
- It will ensure a higher level of security for China's energy supply lines
- Transportation costs will be substantially lower compared to the Malacca strait route
- The route involves minimal risk.
- It requires a significantly shorter transit time.

How China Looks Pakistan in the global perspective?

If we want to comprehend China's perception of Pakistan from the standpoint of global politics, we should consider Pakistan's intertwined connections to the United States, China herself, and the Arab world, among other factors. Because to the U.S -led military incursions in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, the United States' ambitions to restore local stability in the Middle East have experienced a catastrophic defeat.

The economic, logistical, and consequences of war of military involvement in the area steadily undermined national backing for armed response in the territory, and, with the establishment of Islamic State in 2014, there were significant waves of communal sentiment in the United States demanding disengagement from the Middle East (Trofimov, 2015), with U.S. humanitarian operations in Afghanistan as well as armed and political assistance for Pakistan coming under increased analysis. That's why the United States had acted as a go-between for Chinese participation in Afghanistan, with the broader public applauding China's greater participation. According to this tendency, the United States is concerned, while attempts to rebuild the regulate in Afghanistan are not maintained, there would be a leadership emptiness in Afghanistan, which will allow terrorists affiliated with the Taliban, the Islamic State, but even pro-Pakistan radicals can cut up out political authority. If China can successfully distribute the load with the United States while also exercising power on Pakistan, it ought to be enough to stabilize the current geopolitical scenario in Afghanistan, according to some analysts(Lee, 2016).

The term Gwadar literally translates as "the gate of air" in the native tongue. A component of the Omanian Sultanate, at initially, it was a separate state. Pakistan has recognized the importance of Gwadar and has purchased it for $3 million. When it comes for the month of September 1958. It was in 1964 when Pakistan designated Gwadar as a port. In this light, General Perez Musharraf's decision in 2001 to prepare a draught of the Gwadar Port proposal was a watershed moment in the history of Pakistan. The very first stage of the port expansion programmed began on March 22, 2002, and was completed in December 2005, with the assistance of the Chinese government (Anwar, 2010).

India- US Naval Presence in the Strait of Malacca:

This naval work out inside the Bay of Bengal, performed in September 2007, was significant since it constituted part of Malabar-2, which was named such as Malabar-1 exercises has already been performed in western Pacific former at the time, in April 2007, between US and Indian sailing troops. In addition to the Indian and US navies, the Japanese navy participated in similar Malabar naval exercises in 2007, 2009, and 2010. Every one of these drills got set in western Pacific seas within the "forward offensive perimeter" (US) or "first island chain" (China). Although Japan was unable to participate in the Malabar 2011 exercise as initially scheduled because to the environmental and nuclear catastrophes that devastated the country in 2011, it did participate in a diplomatic exercise with the United States. MALABAR 2011, which got set in the western Pacific, east of the Luzon Strait, featured the USS Blue Ridge, the Seventh Fleet's flagship, and a fleet of five formidable Indian ships, among others. Malabar 2011 was dubbed a "anti-China military block" by the Chinese press(Scott, 2012).

India has also been lured into additional US-led missions in the Pacific, which are farther away in the region. In September 2010, Indian officers engaged in the Habu Nag amphibious ground training drills for the East China's Sea with the US navy, much to the chagrin of Chinese officials (Khurana, 2014). After being invited to participate in American Valiant Shield maneuvers off the coast of Guam in 2006, the Indian Navy agreed. During the Salvex drills in Hawaii in February 2012, Indian navy authorities joined US naval soldiers. While India was allowed as an authorized spectator to the Rimpac naval drills off the coast of Hawaii in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010, China was not.

This is significant since the drills were arranged by the United States. In contrast to the continued absence of the Chinese army at Rimpac 2012, China seems to be on the verge of being invited to the next edition of the conference. "We were beginning to look at the Indian as well as Pacific seas as a one theatre, if you will, and it obviously highlights the significance of India," said one US analyst of Rimpac 2012, referring to the conference's Indo-Pacific focus. Various other units of India's military forces were propelled to the Pacific. When India sent leaders and troops to Hawaii for Exercise YudhAbhyas "training for War" in September 2006, it was the first in a bi-annual series of bilateral cooperation that would be replicated in Hawaii in 2008 also Alaska the following year. In a similar vein, Operations Cope Thunder saw Indian Air Force troops travel all crosswise Pacific in February 2004 to participate in combined training with American forces in Alaska, which were immediately tracked by the Red Flag maneuvers in Alaska the following year.

In spite of the fact that India's entry into Pacific Asia is not commonly explained or accepted in context of China, Indian analysts are willing, and very properly so, to perceive its China-related logic as follows:

"Contest and contention with China has emerged as a crucial part of this grand game.... According to a critical examination of India's Look East policy, which is a component of the country's broader foreign affairs in Asia, one of the key aims of the strategic plan is to take part in a latest balancing game not in favor of China in the Southeast Asian as well as Asia-Pacific regions" (Batabyal, 2006).

It is necessary to collaborate more closely with the United States, with their various naval assets serving as a crucial channel for practical collaboration. Focusing eastward, "the solution to the Indian Navy's latest commitment with Asia resides in its evaluations of also interaction with the United States as well as Chinese fleets," according to the report's authors. Stephen Walt's threatening logic (including its parameters of collective power, unpleasant military potentials, geological closeness, and also anticipated aggressive intents) is reflected in India's appraisal of China, which results in a substantially greater degree of collaboration with the United States Navy than with the China's Navy.

America's political leaders have been outspoken in their support for India's entry into the western Pacific. "We need India to,,,, seem East,' we need India to 'take on East,' and the United States as well as India can collaborate," Obama said in 2010. 103 In 2011, it was an issue of merging security interests for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: India, which straddles the oceans as of the Indian to the Pacific Oceans, is a custodian of these rivers with us. We're both passionate about the future of the area they link... The US aims to work with India on a variety of issues, with maritime security being at the top of the list (Umarov, 2015).

It was explicitly stated that the danger from piracy as well as Islamist deterioration of sea lanes was a concern; however the implied unsaid concern was preserving the South China Sea free from China's dominance also essentially restraining Chinese blue water naval growth inside the western Pacific plus Indian Ocean. Observers in India noted that Clinton's address demonstrated the United States' desire for "a more comprehensive maritime collaboration with the Indian Navy in the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and ultimately the Pacific Ocean" (Dikshit, 2011). In December 2011, in cooperation India and the United States pressed for a discussion on maritime safety at the East Asia meeting, as well as for global law to be implemented in the South China Sea, as a policy phrase for their comparable critiques of Chinese posture on the Korean Peninsula.

Gwadar Port's Strategic importance & China interest in the region:

The strategic location of Port Gwadar lies on the coast of Pakistan's Baluchistan region, 72 kilometers away from the Iranian port of Chabahar and 320

kilometers distant from the Oman port of Cape al-Had, as well as being close to the Strait of Hormuz. It is around 460 kilometers distant from Karachi (Anwar, 2010)and sees approximately 40% of all global ships. It is important for Pakistan and China to link Gwadar to the rest of the world via a roads and railways connection network because of the deep water port's geopolitical and economic significance. China has ambitious for Gwadar Port in the long term, and they intend to deepen their alliance with Pakistan by attempting to turn the port into a commercial and transportation hub. They also intend to construct an oil pipeline from Gwadar to the Chinese region of Xinjiang, which would generate millions of jobs and billions of dollars in income(Khan, 2012, 2013). Baluchistan is an area of worldwide great value because of the political crisis that exists in the region, in which the Baloch people are agitating for freedom, separation, decent administration, and, ultimately, completely independent from the Pakistani government.

This massive endeavor has had significant consequences for the security and defense of not just Baluchistan, but also the entire territory. The current Baloch conflict has brought to the attention of domestic and multilateral parties the geo-strategic significance of this area, and Baluchistan has been reduced to the position of a common factor among them. ' In reality, no country's policy in the area that is competing for power and influence can be described as full and realistic unless it includes Baluchistan in its security and defense planning and implementation efforts. Great Powers in the area, varying from peripheral to center, focus their divergent focus on Baluchistan in such a way that the territory is subjected to political pressure of variable intensity at a diversity of periods in time and with varying degrees of breathing room and freedom(Javaid and Jahangir, 2020). The national defense of China's (SLOCs) Sea lines of communication that traverse the Indian Ocean, which are primarily used for commercial and energy transportation, continue to be of paramount importance in the Indian Ocean.

Beijing is acutely aware that its maritime channels of communication in the Indian Ocean are very vulnerable to instability and pressures from both government and nonparties, especially from one side to the other of the ocean. In the Persian Gulf, 40% of Chinese unrefined oil is sent via the Strait of Hormuz, while around 82% of Chinese lubrication is shipped through the Malacca Strait, which runs through the heart of South East Asia and into Southeast Asia. When it comes to presenting China's "Malacca Dilemma," this latest flanking maneuver illustrates the country's "Malacca Dilemma." China's strategists are anxious that a probable opponent may be persuaded to limit Chinese commerce across the Malacca Strait or in another location in the Indian Ocean as a dealing fragment in the midst of a more generalized long argument about the scenario. China now unconditionally acknowledges the role played by the United States in ensuring maritime security and protection in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, however it has a very unusual sight of India's strategic goals(Brewster, 2014).

Economics aspects of Gwadar Port:

The storage capability of Gwadar is between 300 and 400 million tons per year. Gwadar is linked to the rest of the globe as a massive economy with a $20 trillion GDP. Gwadar has a far larger capacity over Chabahar. Tanoli(Tanoli, 2016)Afghanistan, China, and the Central Asian states all utilize Pakistan's Gwadar Port for power transit and commerce. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan have proposed a rail route connecting Gwadar and Kashghar, which they hope would be beneficial in the long run. Pakistan's banking system reveres the Gwadar Port project, which is now under development. Port Gwadar has the potential to become a significant player in the Economic growth of Pakistan. It is China's interest to establish Kashghar and Gwadar Port as SEZs (special economic zones); Pak-China trade, which is in desperate of need FDI (foreign direct investments) from China; and the construction of an energy transit route; and the expansion of commerce, transportation, infrastructural, sustainable growth, and job possibilities(Khan, 2012, 2013).

This port, which contributes 20.9% of the country's gross domestic product and financial information for 43.5% of its employees, would help to increase farm productivity. It is estimated that shipping in Pakistan contributed 36.3% of the country's GDP in 2012, while offshore spreads stocks contributed 10% to the country's overall earnings, ranking it among the world's top 30 frugalities. The number of ampoules

contract in domain's ports has increased by 9% in comparison to the previous year. It has been argued that the extent of naval commerce corresponds to the breadth of a country's economic activity. The port of Gwadar has a flow level of assets ranging from $ 26 billion to $ 46 billion. When the country first opened its seaports in 2000, its annual commerce volume was 42 million tones, but it has since increased to 78 million tons in 2015. A new port in Gwadar would provide incredible money for Pakistan, as well as encouragement and benefits for the country's economies in general of foreign direct investment, transportation income, trade growth, infrastructure advances, job possibilities, an increase in foreign currency reserves, fresh employment prosperity, boosting the economic growth new sectors and markets, and riches for those who can access them (Tanoli, 2016). As little more than a part of this discussion, we will look at how important the position of Gwadar Port and Kashgar City is, the geo-economic relevance and advantages of mutually initiatives for China as well as Pakistan, the influence on local commerce in common, and economic ties in scrupulous, and what it all equates to in practical conditions.

Impact on Bilateral Trade:

China has surpassed the United States as Pakistan's most important commercial partner, with trade volume reaching more than $12 billion in January 2013. Pakistan's exports to China were $3.14 billion, while imports of Goods totaled $9.2 billion, according to the World Bank. It was textile items that had the largest growth in exports. Vegetable products, metals, chemicals, ores and mineral products, leather goods, and base metals were among the other types of exports from the country. Machinery and electromechanical appliances, textiles and textile goods, metals, pharmaceuticals, iron ore, and transportation equipment are among the items imported from China. Over the previous year's numbers, a significant rise in trade volume of 48 percent happened in a single year.

In Pakistan, 36 projects with a total value of $14 billion would be undertaken as part of the five-year Development Program for Economic and Trade Cooperation (DPEC). As per Masood Khan, the former Pakistani Envoy to China, the Joint Economic Commission would oversee the execution of these projects, which will affect the energy, transportation, industrial, agriculture, health care, and institutions. Because of the upgrading of a 335-kilometer portion of the KKH from Gilgit to Khunjrab Pass, which will transform the highway into an all-weather link, bilateral and cross-border trade with the Central Asian area is expected to increase, opening up new possibilities for business along the new Silk Route. However, the reality on the ground contradicts this statement. Chinese assistance is now being provided to Pakistan in more than 250 development projects, including major infrastructure projects like the Gwadar port and the Khyber Pass Highway, as previously reported. Although it is true that China's outside expenditure has totaled over $300 billion between 2005 and 2011, with Pakistan's part remaining relatively small, it is hoped that with the transfer of Gwadar Port operations to China, Chinese investment in Pakistan would significantly increase. All of the indicators are already in place.

The effects of India-US Naval presence on China's strategy

Emergence of Chin in the Global System:

As previously said, this is important to consider the environment in which this reunion has taken place. As has been said before, the basic premise of my hypothesis is that the rising of China is a major aspect in the expansion of ties between the United States and Indian. Researchers such as Rajagopalan, who is highlighted in the literature review, believe that the emergence of China is a contributing factor to the United States and India's tighter connection during the previous two decades. Taking this paper's hypothetical point of study into deliberation, the reconciliation of the United States as well as India may be noted as a counterbalance to the rising of China. To yet, no definition or explanation has been provided for the phrase "the rising of China." To understand what the rise of China means, as well as the implications of this for India plus the United States, it is necessary to grasp the idea of "rise of China." The growth of China may be seen from a variety of perspectives, primarily notably via quantitative data, such as economically and militarily statistics.



Figure 2: China's share of the global production has increased over time, rising from 2.19% in 1980 to 12.92% in 2009 as stated in the preface, China's proportion of the world's GDP depends on purchasing power parity (PPP) was 18.69% in 2018, indicating that it has grown throughout the period 2009-2018. Applying offensive realism to this reality, it is conceivable to claim that China's economic progress may be examined as if the sharing of potentials within the global system has changed and continues to change. Defenders of defense realist theory say that when a system's composition of its distribution of capabilities changes, the system's change in composition may be used to explain the system's change in capability distribution. Also according to the doctrine of offensive realism, while evaluating the deployment of abilities, it is not only defense capacity that should be taken into account, but also economic potentials. As a result, China's economic potentials have grown significantly since its economic reorganizations began in 1978 and continue to grow now. In order to achieve this dream of a latest silk route, which places China at the middle, the plan seeks to build massive infrastructural projects. "OBOR would allow China to assure energy security for herself by establishing transportation routes from Central Asia, Russia, and South East

Because to China's economic reforms, which began in 1978, the country has seen exceptional phases of rapid economic development. According to World Bank statistics (see figure 1), China has had times of rapid economic development as contrasted to India, the United States, and other states throughout history. Between 1991 and 2010, China's average annual growth rate was above 10%, while the world's average annual growth rate was less than 3%. Despite the fact that China's yearly growth speed in 2017 is lower than the actual growth speed between 1991 and 2010, it is at rest greater than the typical GDP growth speed of the rest of the world as well as the United States for 2017. For example, in terms of economic development, this is one component to consider in order comprehending China's ascent. It is also significant to imagine the proportion of China's GDP in the world's GDP to fully comprehend China's ascent. By examining figure 2 (see p. 31), it is easy to see that Chinese proportion

of the world's GDP has increased over time, rising from 2.19% in 1980 to 12.92% in 2009.

Asia's deep oceans," says Montgomery Blah. In addition to, the expansion of infrastructure in other countries would assist to boost requirements for Chinese products and services" (Blah 2018: 317). It is a massive initiative on the part of China, as shown by the reality that an early expansion budget of 40 billion USD has been set aside to finance the first phase of the program. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is crucial to recognize in respect to China-India relations since it is an issue of concern for both countries, as will be discussed more below. The BRI is being introduced today because it provides as an exemplar of how China's economic progress has allowed the country to embark on large-scale initiatives such as the BRI, which is the rationale for its introduction. Even 20 years ago, it would have been unthinkable that China would have been capable to embark on a task of this scope.



Taking into account the country's economic progress, it is in a position to improve its defense capacity. According to the most recent data from SIPRI on tendencies in armed spending up to 2018, this is clear to see from numbers that China has improved its defense capacity since the previous study was published. China spent roughly 250 billion USD on its military in 2018, making it the second highest spender of US dollars behind the United States. This represents an increase of 87% in military spending since 2009. Despite the fact that expenditure as a percentage of GDP has decreased from 2.1% in 2009 to 1.9% in 2018, the country has nonetheless increased spending in continuous and present USD terms than in 2009. (SIPRI 2019: 2). As previously discussed, one of the reasons for this is

the country's economic progress. Even while China's military expenditure has decreased as a percentage of GDP over the last 20 years, as the Chinese economy has expanded during the past two decades, the country has increased its total expenditure in absolute amounts. In addition, when looking at China's military budget in constant US dollars, this may be seen. China's military expenditures were around 131 billion USD in 2009, but they were over 250 billion USD in 2018. (SIPRI 2019). The data comes of 2000 also demonstrates that China had grown her armed spending as China used up approximately 41 billion USD in that year, a trend that has continued. However, it must be noted that the figures obtained by SIPRI in relation to China differs from the methodology used by the organization in gathering and estimating military spending for other countries in other regions. Data from official sources supplied by National regimes, followed by inferior resources, form the foundation of SIPRI's analysis. Nevertheless, in the case of China, the SIPRI projections of Chinese military spending contain resources that are not included in the official Chinese defense budget given by the government (SIPRI 2019).

As a result, the estimates for China are extra of an estimate from the standpoint of SIPRI, but they nevertheless reflect a reliable representation of the country's military spending. Having supposed that, the information from SIPRI is motionless useful in gaining a better understanding of China's growing powers and how its economic growth has been subordinated to the firm extent to a military growth, as seen by the country's rising investment on its military. It is necessary to consider the defense capacity of the United States as well as India in order to comprehend Chinese military expansion. The United States continues to spend the most on its military.

Chinese military's maritime capabilities have seen the most significant improvement in the previous two decades, and this has been particularly true in recent years. Since 1996, according to Eric Heginbotham and colleagues, the China's navy has undergone a fast modernization and expansion of capability. Using the example of China's surface fleet, they claim that the country has undergone a tremendous transformation: "As recently as 2003, merely approximately 14% of their killers and 24% of their Frigates could be deemed latest– accomplished of offensive as well as offensive operations besides a formidable adversary." By 2015, the percentages had increased to 65 percent and 69 percent, correspondingly" (Heginbotham et al 2015: 30). As a result of the discussion in this part, it is now possible to comprehend China's ascent, both economically as well as militarily, by looking at quantitative information as well as actual instances of China's behavior inside Asia. As offensive realism and Waltz claimed, modifications in the allocation of resources in the global system may describe the mobility in the arrangement between both the big powers.

Because of this, the United States and India may see China's growth from its own strengths, economic as well as armed growth, and consequent aggressive behavior in Asia, such as in the region of South China Sea plus the Indian Ocean, as a trend that will lead to China being the dominant power in Asia, as will be discussed more below. As a product, the United States plus India may have built their relations between the two countries as a reaction to Chinese ascent in Asia and as a means of countering Chinese influence. The next part will look at how China's ascent has posed a threat to both the US and India, as well as how this has prompted a reconciliation of US-India ties.

US-India Quasi-alliance in the 21st century:

The coalition between the United States as well as India during the previous two decades will be examined and contextualized in this chapter. However, the paper has simply implied that the US and India have formed a stronger connection and has not provided specific instances of their collaboration up to this point in time. First and foremost, the instances provided in this part will confirm the results made in the preceding segment, which is that the emergence of China has improved the ties between the United States and India, since their affiliation is essentially characterized by military collaboration between the two countries. Second, this part is important to include in the outline because it will give an alternative perspective to the question of why the United States and India have only created a quasi-coalition in recent years.

For the period during World War II plus Cold War's conclusion, the company between the United States plus India was classified as a "strained relationship," as was observed in the kliterature study. According to Watering, "during and soon after the Chilly War, ties between the United States and India may be defined as alienated or as a cold peace."Watering (2016), p. 29. In the absence of a detailed discussion of US-Indian ties in the 20th century, it may be argued that the ties, as Watering contends, was alienated due to a variety of circumstances, such as the connection between the US and Pakistan or India's foreign policy philosophy of Non-Alignment with the United States. The ties between the United States and India has enhanced since the conclusion of the Cold War and the implementation of India's economic reforms in 1991, although with some hiccups along the way. Aspects of the US-India relationship that have emerged during the previous two decades include security-defense cooperation, diplomacy, and the economy.

Conclusion

Although, this paper investigated that China's fast economic development, governments have not created strong hard balancing alliances in reaction to the country. This paper finds that a similar resistance to the desire, to create such military alliances has been

shown by China. Strict adjustment, which relies on formal alliances, will most likely stay in the background for the expected future as a technique that emerging countries and current establishment powers may use in reaction to fast changes in the international system, according to experts' Economic exposure is the most probable tactic until the international system has more information about the intents and capabilities of rising and falling countries. This paper further finds that China is more hostile stance; on the other hand, it might urge severe hard balancing throughout the Asia-Pacific region, according to analysts. Moreover nationalist opinions in China, the likelihood of that occurring in the short term (within a decade or two) is low, owing to the fact that China's sustained victory depends on economic exchanges with the rest of the world, predominantly with its neighbors and the US. China likewise has trouble gaining close friends, with the exception of a few countries such as Cambodia and Pakistan. Despite some headway in China's approach of purchasing the loyalty of smaller governments like as Myanmar and Bangladesh, as well as Sri Lanka and the Maldives, it is doubtful that they would provide China with full-fledged military alignment due to fears of ties from the United States and India.

In contrast to China's rise, based on the findings of the study the author uses offensive realism to examine US-India ties. This would be detrimental to their national interests, and it might be claimed that forming a formal coalition between the US with India would generate a security conundrum. Initiating a security crisis in Asia benefits neither the US nor India. The growth of China was cited as a major factor in the normalization of US-India ties. The US is well conscious of its own strengths and is keen to see India prosper and close the power space with China. As previously stated, the purpose of this paper is not to attribute China's ascent as the only cause forcing the US and India to create a quasi-alliance.

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