

CIVIL–MILITARY BARGAINS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF HYBRID REGIMES: EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN

Wajid Khan¹, Dr. Abeeda Qureshi², Abbas Rashid Butt^{*3}

¹Research Fellow, Lahore Institute for Research and Analysis, Lahore, Pakistan

²Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, FCCU, Lahore, Pakistan

^{*3}Research Fellow, Lahore Institute for Research and Analysis, Lahore, Pakistan

¹wajid.khan@lira.uol.edu.pk, ²abeedaqureshi@fccollege.edu.pk,

^{*3}abbas.rashid@lira.uol.edu.pk

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18454015>

Keywords

Hybrid regimes; Civil–military relations; Pakistan; Bargain-driven hybridity; Democratic backsliding

Article History

Received: 27 November 2025

Accepted: 08 January 2026

Published: 22 January 2026

Copyright @Author

Corresponding Author: *

Abbas Rashid Butt

Abstract

Hybrid regimes are often conceptualized as transitional political arrangements, yet many display remarkable durability. This article investigates why hybrid regimes persist despite recurrent elections and periodic alternation in office. It argues that Pakistan's political order is sustained through recurring civil–military bargains that generate reciprocal benefits: civilian leaders secure access to power and electoral legitimacy, while the military preserves veto authority over security, foreign policy, and key economic domains. Drawing on documentary evidence and elite interviews, the analysis demonstrates how these bargains initially stabilized party-based rule but later fragmented, producing regime reconfiguration rather than democratic consolidation. The article advances the concept of bargain-driven hybridity, emphasizing negotiation rather than coercion alone as a central mechanism underpinning regime persistence. Comparative insights from Turkey, Russia, Bangladesh, and Venezuela illustrate how civil-military bargains evolve differently across hybrid regimes, highlighting Pakistan's distinctiveness in sustaining such arrangements as cyclical equilibria. These findings challenge linear models of democratization and democratic backsliding, showing that hybrid regimes can consolidate as durable political settlements. The policy implications suggest that democratic reform efforts must address the incentive structures sustaining civil–military bargains if meaningful democratic consolidation is to become feasible.

1. Introduction

The concept of hybrid regimes has undergone significant rethinking over the past two decades. Once understood as temporary “transit zones” along a linear trajectory toward either democratic consolidation or authoritarian closure, hybrid regimes are now widely recognized as durable and resilient political orders in their own right (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013). This shift has compelled scholars of democratization and authoritarianism to move

beyond teleological models of regime change and to acknowledge that democratic institutions and authoritarian practices can coexist for prolonged periods without necessarily evolving in a democratic or authoritarian direction (Bermeo, 2016; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019).

This growing recognition raises a critical question: what mechanisms account for the endurance of hybrid regimes in contexts where repeated elections, party competition, and institutional reforms might otherwise signal opportunities for

democratic consolidation? Pakistan presents a particularly compelling case through which to address this puzzle. Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has oscillated between periods of direct military rule and civilian government, yet has rarely achieved sustained democratic consolidation (Shah, 2014; Siddiqua, 2007). Formal democratic institutions including parliaments, political parties, and regular multiparty elections have endured, but their effective autonomy has consistently been constrained by entrenched praetorian influences (Huntington, 1968). The 2018 general elections and the subsequent rise of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) under Imran Khan were initially portrayed as a moment of democratic renewal. However, mounting evidence soon pointed to the military's active role in structuring electoral competition, curating governance arrangements, and exercising influence over key policy domains (Adeney, 2017; Shah, 2014). By the end of Khan's tenure in 2022, his removal through a parliamentary vote of no confidence once again exposed the fragility of civilian authority and the persistence of hybrid rule. This article argues that the endurance of Pakistan's hybrid regime cannot be explained solely by military dominance or by the weakness of civilian institutions. Instead, it contends that recurring civil-military bargains constitute the central mechanism sustaining hybrid political systems. Civil-military bargains are conceptualized here as reciprocal arrangements in which civilian elites accept constraints on their governing authority in exchange for military patronage, selective autonomy, or assurances of political survival and stability. In return, the military retains decisive veto power over critical domains, including foreign and security policy, the judiciary, and significant sectors of the economy (Siddiqua, 2007; Shah, 2014). Hybridity, from this perspective, is not merely imposed through coercion but is reproduced through negotiated settlements between civilian and praetorian actors.

Building on this insight, the study advances a theoretical framework of bargain-driven hybridity, emphasizing negotiation rather than repression

alone as the key mechanism underpinning regime persistence. The PTI government (2018–2022) illustrates this dynamic with particular clarity. During the early phase of Khan's rule, a convergence of interests facilitated a relatively stable bargain: the military supported PTI's anti-corruption narrative and electoral legitimacy, while PTI acquiesced to military prerogatives in security and foreign affairs. However, by 2021, disputes over senior intelligence appointments and diverging foreign-policy orientations particularly regarding relations with the United States and Russia began to erode this settlement. As Fair (2023) observes, these tensions reflected a growing rupture between civilian and military elites over strategic autonomy and external alignment. Similarly, Yusuf (2022) underscores that the breakdown of civil-military trust, especially surrounding the appointment of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief, ultimately precipitated the collapse of the PTI government in April 2022. This trajectory demonstrates that while civil-military bargains can stabilize hybrid regimes, their erosion produces regime reconfiguration rather than democratic consolidation. Hybrid rule thus persists through cyclical equilibria, in which bargains are periodically renegotiated rather than dismantled. This article makes three principal contributions. Theoretically, it advances scholarship on hybrid regimes and civil-military relations by moving beyond accounts centered on coercive domination to foreground negotiated bargains as a central mechanism of regime persistence (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013; Huntington, 1968). It argues that hybrid regimes endure not through repression alone, but through reciprocal accommodations that stabilize power while constraining democratic deepening. Empirically, the study draws on elite interviews with journalists, political analysts, and former officials, supplemented by documentary analysis of parliamentary debates, policy reports, and press coverage, to reconstruct the evolution of civil-military bargains during the PTI period. Comparatively, the article situates Pakistan within broader global patterns by engaging cases such as

Turkey, Russia, Bangladesh, and Venezuela, where military and security actors similarly operate as veto players within electoral frameworks (Adeney, 2017; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019). Together, these contributions recast hybrid regimes not as merely “flawed democracies” awaiting consolidation, but as durable political settlements institutionalized through negotiated bargains that embed authoritarian practices within formally democratic systems (Diamond, 2002; Bermeo, 2016).

1.1 Research Objectives

1. To conceptualize and advance bargain-driven hybridity as a theoretical framework explaining the persistence of hybrid regimes.
2. To compare Pakistan’s experience with other hybrid regimes, Turkey, Russia, Bangladesh, and Venezuela, in order to assess both the distinctiveness and broader applicability of bargain-based mechanisms.

1.2 Research Questions

1. How do civil-military bargains function as a mechanism sustaining Pakistan’s hybrid regime, particularly during the PTI government (2018–2022)?
2. How does Pakistan’s experience of bargain-driven hybridity compare with similar mechanisms in other hybrid regimes, and what does this reveal about the global persistence of hybrid political orders?

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Hybrid Regimes and the Question of Durability

The literature on regime types has long struggled to account for political systems that defy the binary classification of democracy and authoritarianism. Early scholarship tended to treat such regimes as transitional, assuming they would evolve into fully consolidated democracies or revert to authoritarian rule. This “transition paradigm,” however, has been increasingly discredited for its teleological assumptions and limited explanatory power (Carothers, 2002). The persistence of regimes that adopt democratic institutions but

practice authoritarian governance challenges linear models of democratization. Hybrid regimes, as Diamond (2002) argues, should not be dismissed as failed or incomplete democracies but analyzed as distinctive political orders. These regimes exhibit democratic features such as competitive elections and functioning legislatures while simultaneously curtailing political freedoms through manipulation of the judiciary, media control, and selective repression. Schedler (2013) describes this paradox as the “politics of uncertainty,” in which elections both threaten incumbents with genuine competition and serve as tools of authoritarian legitimation. As Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) note, elections in authoritarian or hybrid contexts often coexist with manipulation and strategic cooptation, illustrating the paradox of electoral authoritarianism. In Pakistan, uncertainty has historically been managed not merely through manipulation but also through negotiated settlements between civilian and military elites, a dynamic that extends beyond the scope of Schedler’s model.

Levitsky and Way (2010) provided a seminal refinement of hybridity with their concept of competitive authoritarianism. Unlike closed authoritarian systems, competitive authoritarian regimes permit opposition parties and competitive elections, but incumbents systematically tilt the playing field. While their framework has been applied extensively to Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America, Pakistan offers an underutilized case that reflects similar dynamics. The PTI era (2018–2022) illustrates how electoral competition can persist alongside systematic intervention by non-elected actors, particularly the military, which functions as a veto player. Yet Levitsky and Way’s framework, while capturing the competitive nature of authoritarian manipulation, underplays the role of bargains that enable elites to stabilize these regimes in the first place. Building on earlier classifications, Bogaards (2009) distinguishes subtypes of hybrid regimes, emphasizing that hybridity encompasses diverse institutional configurations rather than a single transitional stage. Cassani (2014) similarly underscored the importance of informal practices that reinforce

authoritarian tendencies within democratic institutions. Pakistan's civil-military bargains are precisely such informal practices, structural arrangements not codified in law yet central to political survival. While these frameworks explain the structural resilience of hybrid regimes, they often overlook the negotiated process through which elite actors maintain stability, a gap the concept of civil-military bargains seeks to fill. Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) further argue that civilian actors may cooperate or co-opt authoritarian actors to secure political survival, a dynamic evident in Pakistan's negotiated bargains.

2.2 Democratic Backsliding and Autocratization

Recent scholarship on democratic backsliding has further complicated our understanding of hybridity. Bermeo (2016) observed that classic coups and outright authoritarian takeovers have become less common; instead, incumbents erode democracy through incremental and legalistic strategies such as court packing, media restrictions, and constitutional manipulation. Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) expanded this analysis, identifying a "third wave of autocratization" marked by gradual declines in democratic quality across multiple regions. Waldner and Lust (2018) similarly note that democratic backsliding often occurs through incremental institutional erosion rather than abrupt collapse, consistent with Pakistan's experience of negotiated hybridity. This body of work underscores that hybridity is not merely resilient but may deepen over time, producing durable forms of electoral authoritarianism.

The South Asian experience aligns with these global patterns. Riaz (2019) highlights how Bangladesh has witnessed democratic regression under the Awami League, where elections have become less competitive and opposition increasingly marginalized. DeVotta (2016) documents how the Rajapaksas in Sri Lanka leveraged illiberal nationalism to centralize power while retaining electoral legitimacy. Even India, long celebrated as the world's largest democracy, has seen rising concerns over the erosion of minority protections, judicial independence, and

press freedom (Jaffrelot, 2021). These regional trajectories demonstrate that hybrid regimes are not anomalies but increasingly prevalent across South Asia. Pakistan's persistence as a hybrid regime, however, differs in one crucial respect: while in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka hybridity is largely driven by dominant civilian incumbents, in Pakistan the military remains the central architect of regime equilibrium. Yet here too, existing backsliding literature offers only a partial explanation. Much of it emphasizes how incumbents dismantle institutions from above, but in Pakistan, hybridity often results from bargained interactions between civilians and the military. Civilian leaders do not simply fall victim to military coercion; they frequently enter into agreements that allow them to access power while legitimizing the military's enduring prerogatives. This suggests that backsliding analyses must incorporate the agency of multiple actors, not only incumbents, to explain regime persistence.

2.3 Civil-Military Relations as a Core Explanatory Framework

Civil-military relations scholarship provides the most direct insights into Pakistan's hybrid order. Huntington's (1968) theory of praetorianism remains foundational, identifying how militaries in weakly institutionalized societies act as arbiters of political competition. Stepan (1988) elaborated on this by theorizing tutelary democracies, where militaries permit electoral politics but retain authority over key state functions. Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers, and Wolf (2013) extended this framework in South and Southeast Asia, showing that militaries can institutionalize themselves as veto players even in ostensibly democratic regimes. In Pakistan, this dynamic has been extensively documented. Rizvi (2000) traced the historical evolution of civil-military imbalance, demonstrating how repeated coups normalized praetorian dominance. Jalal (1995) contextualized Pakistan's praetorianism within broader South Asian trajectories, arguing that authoritarian interventions were institutionalized in the state's formative years. More recently, Shah (2014) offered a systematic analysis of how the army

entrenched itself as Pakistan's ultimate political arbiter, combining bureaucratic control, judicial alliances, and coercion. Siddiqi (2007) added a crucial dimension by revealing the military's vast economic empire "Milbus" which entrenched its power across sectors from real estate to manufacturing. Rafiq (2021) further elaborates on the modernized economic autonomy of the armed forces, highlighting how "Military Inc. 2.0" strengthens bargaining leverage. Together, these works establish that Pakistan's military influence is not episodic but deeply institutionalized.

Civilian leaders in hybrid regimes often enter such bargains not merely from weakness but from strategic calculations. Aligning with the military ensures access to power, policy stability, and electoral legitimacy. These motivations render bargains not acts of coercion but rational strategies of survival within constrained political spaces. Haqqani (2020) emphasizes the military's pivotal role in shaping foreign policy decisions, further illustrating the reach of these bargains. Yet despite their valuable insights, many of these studies frame hybridity primarily as an outcome of military dominance, portraying civilians as structurally weak or passive. Adeney (2017) challenged this reductionist view, arguing that Pakistan must be understood as a multidimensional hybrid regime, shaped by ethnic, federal, and judicial dynamics as well as military tutelage. Still, even this analysis underplays the role of active bargains between civilians and the military. Civilian leaders often calculate that alignment with the military secures short-term political survival, even if it compromises democratic autonomy. By focusing predominantly on coercion and institutional weakness, existing literature misses this negotiated dimension of hybridity.

2.4 The Comparative Dimension: Beyond Pakistan

Comparative analysis underscores why a bargain-based framework is essential. In Turkey, Erdoğan's early years (2002–2007) were marked by bargains with the military that allowed the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to consolidate power. However, these bargains eventually gave way to

civilian dominance, demonstrating that bargains can be transitional (Özbudun, 2015; Yılmaz, 2018). In Russia, by contrast, Putin institutionalized a durable bargain with security services, embedding them within state structures and ensuring their loyalty while concentrating power in the presidency (Gel'man, 2015; Levitsky & Way, 2010). Bangladesh offers yet another variation, where the military has acted as a broker in civilian politics, facilitating party dominance while retaining influence behind the scenes (Riaz, 2019; Lewis, 2011). Venezuela, meanwhile, illustrates cycles of bargains repeatedly collapsing, with military or authoritarian interventions reasserting dominance whenever civilian leaders overstepped informal power arrangements (Corrales & Penfold, 2011; Trinkunas, 2015). Like Pakistan, Venezuela's hybrid regime demonstrates how recurring bargains between civilian leaders and security institutions can temporarily stabilize political order, though repeated breakdowns have led to cycles of erosion and renegotiation. Pakistan differs from these cases in that its military functions not as a transitional veto player but as a permanent institutionalized actor. Bargains in Pakistan are not temporary expedients but the foundational mechanism through which hybridity is reproduced.

2.5 Civil-Military Bargains: Toward a Conceptual Framework

This article advances the concept of **civil-military bargains** to address a critical gap in hybrid regime scholarship. Civil-military bargains are defined as reciprocal arrangements in which civilian elites cede autonomy in key policy domains such as security, foreign policy, and the economy in exchange for military support, legitimacy, or political stability. Unlike coercion-based explanations, this framework emphasizes negotiated reciprocity; unlike structural accounts, it foregrounds agency on both sides. This framework makes three contributions. First, it refines hybrid regime theory by identifying a mechanism of persistence that explains how hybridity can endure for decades without

democratic consolidation or authoritarian closure. Second, it enriches civil-military relations scholarship by shifting focus from unilateral dominance to negotiated settlements that institutionalize praetorian influence. Third, it

situates Pakistan within comparative debates, demonstrating how bargains sustain hybridity in ways distinct from Turkey's civilian consolidation or Thailand's coup-driven cycles.




Figure 1. Conceptual Model of Bargain-Driven Hybridity

Figure 1 conceptualizes bargain-driven hybridity as a negotiated political equilibrium sustained through reciprocal civil-military arrangements. Rather than viewing hybridity as the outcome of coercive military dominance or civilian institutional weakness alone, the model emphasizes bargaining as the central mechanism of regime persistence. Civilian elites secure electoral access, political survival, and limited governing autonomy, while military actors retain veto authority over core domains such as security, foreign policy, judicial processes, and key economic sectors. These bargains produce a hybrid regime characterized by competitive elections alongside entrenched authoritarian constraints. Crucially, the model highlights the cyclical nature of hybridity: when elite interests

converge, bargains stabilize the regime; when preferences diverge, bargains fracture, producing regime reconfiguration rather than democratic consolidation. This dynamic explains both the durability and instability of hybrid regimes. By conceptualizing hybridity as the product of recurring bargains, this article highlights both the resilience and fragility of hybrid regimes. Bargains stabilize political orders when elite interests converge, but they remain inherently unstable. As Slater (2010) and Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) observe, elite pacts that sustain hybrid regimes are prone to collapse when preferences diverge or resource flows shift. The PTI era (2018–2022), as subsequent sections demonstrate, exemplifies this dual dynamic of stabilization and rupture.

3. Research Method

The study of hybrid regimes requires methodological approaches capable of identifying the causal mechanisms through which formal democratic institutions coexist with, and are undermined by, informal practices. Because hybridity is often sustained through negotiated arrangements and extra-constitutional influence, aggregate democracy indices such as Freedom House or Polity IV tend to obscure the processes through which power is actually exercised (Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). This study therefore adopts a qualitative case study design oriented toward process tracing, which allows systematic analysis of causal sequences rather than reliance on outcome-based indicators (George & Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007). Empirically, it examines Pakistan under the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government (2018–2022) as a paradigmatic case of persistent hybridity, focusing on how civil–military bargains structured both regime endurance and political instability. Pakistan is analytically well suited for this purpose because it combines competitive electoral politics with entrenched authoritarian practices (Adeney, 2017), features a military that has exercised sustained political influence through indirect as well as direct intervention (Shah, 2014; Rumi, 2019), and experienced a critical juncture during the PTI period in which a populist civilian government failed to consolidate democratic autonomy despite electoral legitimacy (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). The case also offers comparative leverage for theory-building given its partial convergence with, and divergence from, other hybrid regimes such as Turkey, Venezuela, and Bangladesh (Croissant & Kamerling, 2013). The analysis draws on elite interviews and documentary evidence to trace informal bargaining dynamics and their institutional consequences. Twelve Semi-structured interviews conducted between 2022 and 2023 with journalists, retired military officials, civil society actors, and policy analysts were selected through purposive and snowball sampling to access perspectives central to informal decision-making but rarely captured in official records (Aberbach &

Rockman, 2002). These interviews are triangulated with parliamentary debates, party manifestos, judicial decisions, press coverage, and policy statements on foreign and economic governance to identify patterns of civilian–military interaction and arenas of deference and contestation (International Crisis Group, 2018). Data were analyzed using thematic coding to identify recurring patterns across sources (Saldaña, 2013), with inductively generated codes linked to the theoretical framework of civil–military bargains. By employing process tracing, the study reconstructs the sequencing of key bargains and ruptures during PTI's tenure, demonstrating not only that such bargains existed but also how their breakdown contributed to regime instability in a hybrid political order.

Although Pakistan is the central focus, the research design aims for theoretical generalization rather than statistical representativeness (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). By situating Pakistan alongside other cases where militaries act as veto players such as Turkey, Russia, and Venezuela, the analysis highlights the general utility of the bargain's framework. Several limitations are acknowledged. First, access to senior military decision-makers was constrained, a common challenge in research on authoritarian or hybrid regimes (Barany, 2012). This was mitigated through triangulation across journalists, retired officers, and secondary accounts. Second, self-censorship and bias among respondents may have affected interviews, given Pakistan's restrictive media environment (Freedom House, 2023). To address this, interviews were anonymized and corroborated with independent documentary sources. Third, while a single-case study cannot provide statistical generalization, its aim is theory. Given the sensitivity of the subject, ethical protocols were followed rigorously. Interviewees were informed of the research purpose, granted the right to withdraw, and assured confidentiality. Data were anonymized, and identifying details were withheld to protect respondents from potential reprisals (Wood, 2006). Such ethical safeguards are indispensable in research contexts where discussing the military carries political risks.

Table 1. Demographics of Interviewees

No #	Interviewee	Designation Role	/	Sector	Location	Year	Gender
1	Opposition parliamentarian	Member Parliament, Opposition	of	Politics	Islamabad	2023	Male
2	Defense analyst	Security / Defense Analyst		Policy / Think Tank	Karachi	2023	Male
3	Retired diplomat	Retired Diplomat		Foreign Affairs	Islamabad	2023	Male
4	Opposition politician	Senior Opposition Politician		Politics	Islamabad	2023	Male
5	Journalist 1	Senior Journalist		Media	Islamabad	2022	Male
6	Journalist 2	Political Correspondent		Media	Lahore	2022	Female
7	Civil society actor 1	NGO Executive		Civil Society	Islamabad	2023	Female
8	Civil society actor 2	Policy Researcher		Civil Society	Karachi	2023	Male
9	Retired military official 1	Retired Brigadier		Military	Rawalpindi	2022	Male
10	Retired military official 2	Retired Colonel		Military	Rawalpindi	2023	Male
11	Policy analyst 1	Economic Foreign Analyst	/ Policy	Think Tank	Islamabad	2023	Male
12	Policy analyst 2	Governance Analyst		Think Tank	Lahore	2023	Male

4. Pakistan's Hybrid Political Trajectory

The persistence of hybridity in Pakistan cannot be understood without situating the PTI government (2018–2022) within the *longue durée* of civil-military relations. Since independence, Pakistan has oscillated between military rule and civilian governments, producing a political order where the military functions as a permanent veto player (Jalal, 2014; Rizvi, 2000). This trajectory reveals hybridity not as a transient stage but as a deeply

institutionalized equilibrium. Early coups in the 1950s established patterns of praetorian dominance, reinforced through bureaucratic control and judicial legitimation (Jalal, 1995; Shah, 2014). The 2018 elections illustrate the hybrid nature of Pakistan's political system, where electoral legitimacy coexists with structural constraints imposed by military actors (Rumi, 2019; Abbasi, 2021). Over time, recurring bargains between civilian leaders and the military

entrenched a hybrid regime structure that remains resilient to democratic consolidation, while disputes over strategic appointments and foreign policy occasionally destabilized this balance (Fair, 2022, 2023; Haqqani, 2020).

4.1 Civil-Military Bargains and the Persistence of Hybrid Governance in Pakistan: Insights from Interviews

The interviews with politicians, defense analysts, retired diplomats, journalists, civil society actors, and policy experts consistently illustrate how Pakistan's hybrid governance operates through bargain-driven mechanisms. Across the cases, several interrelated themes emerge, demonstrating the durability and institutionalization of civil-military bargains.

4.1.1 Military as Permanent Veto Player

All interviewees emphasized the military's role as a permanent and decisive actor in governance. Strategic domains particularly intelligence appointments, foreign policy, and defense leadership, remain largely non-negotiable. Civilian autonomy is tolerated in areas such as welfare programs, economic reforms, and domestic administration, but overstepping red lines triggers pushback. As one retired military official observed: *"Khan attempted to influence intelligence appointments and foreign policy decisions, areas traditionally reserved for the military. That was unprecedented for a civilian leader... Bargains exist precisely to prevent unilateral overreach"* (Retired Brigadier, Interview 9).

Similarly, a defense analyst highlighted the stakes of the DG-ISI appointment: *"Appointments like DG-ISI are symbolic and strategic, they signal who calls the shots. When the prime minister resisted the transfer, it wasn't a bureaucratic disagreement, it was a confrontation over authority itself"* (Defense Analyst, Interview 2).

These accounts align with the model presented in

Table 2 and Figure 1, in which Pakistan is characterized as a **durable hybrid regime sustained by a permanent veto player**.

4.1.2 Shadow of Oversight and Bargaining Dynamics

Civilian governance in Pakistan operates under a "shadow of oversight", where decisions appear autonomous but are often negotiated informally with the military. Divergence from established norms triggers recalibration rather than systemic collapse. For example: *"Once the military's active support was withdrawn, PTI's policy space shrank... even minor disagreements in defense or foreign policy were amplified because they were perceived as challenges to the military's authority"* (Defense Analyst, Interview 2).

A retired diplomat noted the foreign policy implications: *"Khan's Moscow visit symbolized autonomy, but it also revealed the fragility of bargains when civilian actions collide with military expectations, tensions escalate rapidly"* (Retired Diplomat, Interview 3).

These narratives reinforce the **dynamic and cyclical nature of civil-military bargains**, consistent with Pakistan's recurring equilibrium described in Figure 1.

4.1.3 Media as Signal and Stabilizer

Journalists reported that media coverage functions as both observer and participant in sustaining hybridity. Initially supportive coverage can shift to critical reporting if civilian leaders overstep perceived boundaries, thereby signaling institutional limits. *"Media amplifies bargaining dynamics... stories about DG-ISI, foreign policy misalignments, or populist policies acted as informal feedback to actors on the permissible range of civilian autonomy"* (Senior Journalist, Interview 5).

Another journalist added: *"Reporting on intelligence appointments or military affairs required caution... many journalists internalized these constraints, which indirectly reinforced hybrid structures"* (Political Correspondent, Interview 6). This demonstrates that media is not neutral; it stabilizes the hybrid equilibrium by transmitting subtle cues about acceptable civilian behavior.

4.1.4 Civil Society and Policy Research

Civil society actors and policy analysts operate mostly at the **periphery**, observing rather than directly shaping decisions. Informal negotiations largely determine policy outcomes, limiting avenues for oversight. *“Bargains create predictability but limit oversight... public-facing institutions may appear independent, but much happens in informal corridors”* (NGO Executive, Interview 7). *“Analysts must consider informal mechanisms, elite incentives, and recurrent bargaining patterns. Focusing solely on elections, laws, or institutions gives a partial picture of power distribution”* (Policy Analyst 1, Interview 11). These insights underscore the necessity of examining both formal and informal channels to understand hybrid governance in Pakistan.

4.1.5 Public Perception and Democracy

The interviews consistently note that the public often misinterprets institutional tensions as political incompetence or personal rivalries, masking the role of negotiated power. *“People often see elections as the ultimate determinant of governance. In reality, informal negotiations shape policy outcomes. Democracy exists within these negotiated constraints; it is not absolute”* (Senior Opposition Politician, Interview 4). *“The public sees the drama but rarely the mechanics. They interpret clashes as personal or partisan conflicts, not institutional negotiations”* (Senior Journalist, Interview 5). Thus, while electoral processes provide the appearance of democracy, the underlying structure preserves hybridity.

4.1.6 Lessons for Civilian Leadership and Opposition

Interviewees emphasized that civilian leaders and opposition parties must understand informal rules, read institutional signals, and operate within negotiated boundaries: *“Civilian leaders must understand both the formal rules of governance and the informal rules of engagement. Failure to do so can make even a popular government vulnerable”* (Opposition Parliamentarian, Interview 1). *“Always read the balance of power. Electoral strength alone doesn’t guarantee policy implementation. Strategic understanding of civil–military bargains is essential for maneuvering effectively”* (Senior Opposition

Politician, Interview 4). This highlights that strategic negotiation and timing are crucial for effective governance under hybrid conditions.

4.1.7 Hybrid Regime Persistence

Finally, all respondents reinforced the notion that Pakistan’s hybrid governance is institutionally resilient. Bargains are cyclical, recalibrated after crises, and embedded in both formal and informal structures. *“Even popular leaders can’t bypass these structures. Stability is not imposed but negotiated”* (Retired Colonel, Interview 10). *“Civil–military bargains are cyclical and institutionally embedded, not ad hoc... Even after PTI’s ouster, the system persisted under new actors”* (Policy Analyst 1, Interview 11). The interviews collectively demonstrate that Pakistan’s hybrid regime endures through recurrent, negotiated civil–military bargains. The military retains veto power over strategic domains, civilian leaders exercise constrained autonomy, and media, civil society, and opposition parties function as informal feedback mechanisms. Public perception often underestimates the depth of these bargains, mistaking strategic negotiations for political failure. Overall, Pakistan exemplifies a bargain-driven hybrid system, in which equilibrium is maintained through negotiation, recalibration, and institutionalized cycles rather than outright dominance or collapse.

5. Comparative Analysis

Hybrid regimes are not unique to Pakistan, and civil–military bargains have played important roles in sustaining hybridity elsewhere. Yet these bargains follow divergent trajectories: in some cases, they collapse into civilian dominance; in others, they are absorbed into authoritarian closure or subordinated to dominant-party rule. This section compares Pakistan with four cases, Turkey, Russia, Bangladesh, and Venezuela to highlight the variations. These cases were selected because each illustrates a distinct trajectory of bargains: collapse (Turkey), absorption (Russia), episodic (Bangladesh), and authoritarian entrenchment (Venezuela). By situating Pakistan within this spectrum, the analysis clarifies its

uniqueness as a case of recurrent, institutionalized bargains.

5.1 Turkey: From Bargains to Civilian Dominance

For much of the twentieth century, Turkey exemplified a tutelary democracy in which the military functioned as the guardian of secular nationalism (Özbudun, 2015). During its early years in power, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) entered into tacit bargains with the military by refraining from direct challenges to its security prerogatives. These arrangements initially stabilized a hybrid political order, consistent with Schedler's (2013) notion of a "semi-democratic equilibrium." Over time, however, President Erdoğan systematically dismantled military veto power through constitutional reforms, judicial politicization, and purges within the armed forces. The failed coup attempt of 2016 marked a decisive rupture, effectively ending the military's institutional autonomy and enabling the consolidation of competitive authoritarianism under civilian dominance (Yılmaz, 2018). Turkey thus illustrates how civil-military bargains can be transitional, facilitating a shift from tutelary hybridity to dominant-party authoritarianism. Pakistan diverges sharply from this trajectory. Unlike Turkey, where bargains dissolved as civilians consolidated power, Pakistan's military has remained entrenched as a permanent veto player. Civil-military bargains in Pakistan do not collapse into civilian supremacy but are repeatedly renegotiated, sustaining hybridity over time.

5.2 Russia: Absorption into Authoritarian Closure

Russia illustrates a contrasting trajectory in which civil-military and security-sector bargains underpin authoritarian consolidation rather than hybridity. Under Vladimir Putin, military and intelligence elites were incorporated into a vertically integrated system in which loyalty was exchanged for patronage, autonomy, and access to state resources (Levitsky & Way, 2010). What began as elite bargaining was progressively absorbed into a centralized presidential

framework, eliminating meaningful political competition. In theoretical terms, Russia exemplifies how bargains can evolve into mechanisms of authoritarian resilience, aligning with Levitsky and Way's account of competitive authoritarianism transitioning toward closure. Pakistan differs in that civilian executives have never fully co-opted the military. Instead, the military remains an autonomous actor capable of renegotiating or withdrawing support, ensuring that bargains remain cyclical and contested rather than absorbed into a closed authoritarian order.

5.3 Bangladesh: Episodic Bargains and Dominant-Party Rule

Bangladesh represents a model of **episodic civil-military bargaining**, in which the military intervenes intermittently to stabilize political competition during moments of crisis. The military-backed caretaker governments of 1996 and 2007–2008 exemplify such temporary bargains, facilitating elite realignment and short-term stability (Riaz, 2019). However, these interventions did not result in the institutionalization of military veto power. Since 2009, hybridity in Bangladesh has persisted largely through dominant-party rule under the Awami League, characterized by electoral manipulation, repression, and institutional capture (Lewis, 2011). In this context, the military has receded from its role as a central political broker. Bangladesh thus approximates Schedler's (2013) model of electoral authoritarianism without a permanent praetorian core. Pakistan diverges fundamentally from this trajectory. Whereas Bangladesh sustains hybridity through civilian incumbency dominance, Pakistan sustains it through recurring bargains with an institutionalized military veto player.

5.4 Venezuela: Bargains and Authoritarian Entrenchment

Venezuela offers a cross-regional comparison in which civil-military bargains initially stabilized hybridity but later facilitated authoritarian entrenchment. Under Hugo Chávez, the armed forces were granted expanded political influence

and economic patronage in exchange for loyalty. Nicolás Maduro deepened these arrangements by providing the military privileged access to state resources and immunity from prosecution (Corrales & Penfold, 2011; Trinkunas, 2015). Over time, these bargains eliminated meaningful electoral competition, producing authoritarian closure. Venezuela thus demonstrates how bargains can evolve into instruments of regime entrenchment rather than mechanisms sustaining hybridity. Pakistan's experience contrasts sharply with this outcome. Although civil-military bargains in Pakistan periodically collapse, they have not crystallized into authoritarian closure. Instead, breakdowns produce political instability followed by regime reconfiguration, reproducing hybridity rather than eliminating it.

5.5 Comparative Insights: Pakistan's Distinctiveness

The comparative analysis reveals that civil-military bargains vary significantly in their political consequences:

1. **Turkey** illustrates bargains as transitional, collapsing into civilian dominance.
 2. **Russia** demonstrates bargains absorbed into authoritarian closure.
 3. **Bangladesh** shows bargains as episodic, fading as dominant-party rule consolidates.
 4. **Venezuela** highlights bargains facilitating authoritarian entrenchment.
- Pakistan stands apart because its civil-military bargains are recurring and institutionalized. They neither collapse into civilian supremacy, nor dissolve into authoritarian closure, nor fade into irrelevance. Instead, they continuously reproduce hybridity by balancing military prerogatives with civilian access to office. This pattern underscores the core theoretical claim of this article: bargain-driven hybridity represents a distinct and durable regime type, sustained through cyclical elite negotiation rather than linear regime change.

Table 2. Comparative Trajectories of Civil-Military Bargains in Hybrid Regimes

Country	Role of Military	Nature of Bargains / Mechanism	Bargain Trajectory	Outcome on Hybridity / Regime Type	Key Contrast with Pakistan	Key References
Pakistan	Permanent veto player	Continuous negotiation; civilians accept constraints for stability and patronage; military retains veto over security, judiciary, and economy	Recurring & Institutionalized	Durable hybrid regime; hybridity persists despite periodic breakdowns	Bargains reproduce hybridity rather than ending it	Shah, 2014; Siddiqua, 2007; Fair, 2023; Adeney, 2017

Turkey	Guardian-turned-subordinate	Bargains between AKP and military respecting security prerogatives	Transitional	Collapse into civilian dominance; military veto dismantled	Bargains dismantled rather than renewed	Özbudun, 2015; Yılmaz, 2018
Russia	Integrated coercive elite	Security services incorporated into presidential system; loyalty traded for autonomy	Absorptive	Hybrid bargains absorbed into authoritarian closure; competition restricted	Military co-opted, not autonomous	Gel'man, 2015; Levitsky & Way, 2010
Bangladesh	Crisis manager	Military intervenes episodically during crises; facilitates temporary stabilization	Episodic	Dominant-party rule; hybridity sustained without recurring bargains	Bargains fade, party dominance prevails	Riaz, 2019; Lewis, 2011
Venezuela	Patronage beneficiary	Military granted patronage and political influence for loyalty	Authoritarian Entrenchment	Hybrid bargains evolve into entrenched authoritarianism; competition curtailed	Bargains eliminate competition entirely	Corrales & Penfold, 2011; Trinkunas, 2015

Note. Table 2 highlights distinct mechanisms through which hybrid regimes negotiate civil-military bargains. Countries with permanent military vetoes (Pakistan) sustain hybridity, whereas episodic or co-opted militaries (Bangladesh, Russia, Venezuela) produce either dominant-party or authoritarian consolidation. Turkey stands out as a case where civilian actors successfully dismantled the military veto, leading to civilian dominance.

The conceptual model conceptualizes bargain-driven hybridity as a dynamic equilibrium sustained through negotiated exchanges between

civilian elites and the military (see *Figure 1*). The comparative cases illustrate how deviations along each component of the model; veto power, incentive structures, and breakdown outcomes, produce divergent regime trajectories. Turkey represents a case where civilian actors dismantled the military veto node, collapsing the bargain cycle. Russia and Venezuela illustrate paths where the incentive loop becomes asymmetrical, absorbing the military into authoritarian closure. Bangladesh reflects weak institutionalization of the bargaining mechanism, where episodic intervention gives way to dominant-party control.

Pakistan uniquely sustains all core elements of the model simultaneously: a permanent veto player, reciprocal incentives, and cyclical breakdown-reconstitution dynamics. As such, Pakistan approximates the ideal-type case of bargain-driven hybridity.

6. Discussion and Implications

6.1 Rethinking Hybrid Regime Persistence

This article challenges prevailing assumptions that hybrid regimes are inherently transitional or unstable. Existing literature often treats hybridity as an intermediate stage between democracy and authoritarianism (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2013). The Pakistani case demonstrates instead that hybridity can consolidate as a durable political settlement, sustained not primarily through repression but through negotiated civil-military bargains. The concept of *bargain-driven hybridity* reframes persistence as an outcome of strategic equilibrium rather than democratic failure or authoritarian success. The findings suggest that repeated elections and alternation in office do not necessarily weaken hybrid regimes. In Pakistan, electoral competition operates within parameters set by military veto power, consistent with the conceptual model's emphasis on constrained civilian authority. Democratic procedures thus coexist with structural limits, producing stability without consolidation.

6.2 Bargains Beyond Coercion: Theoretical Contributions

Theoretically, this study extends civil-military relations scholarship by foregrounding negotiation and reciprocity over coercion alone. While classical theories emphasize coups, guardianship, or praetorianism, the evidence here points to a subtler mechanism: institutionalized bargaining. The military's dominance is not continuously imposed; it is periodically renegotiated, recalibrated, and legitimized through civilian participation. Comparative analysis reinforces this contribution. Unlike Turkey, where bargains dissolved into civilian authoritarianism, or Venezuela, where they entrenched closure, Pakistan exhibits a self-

reinforcing cycle. This supports the broader claim that bargains can function as equilibrating institutions, not merely transitional compromises.

6.3 Implications for Democratic Backsliding and Regime Change

The study also contributes to debates on democratic backsliding. Much of this literature assumes linear regression driven by executive aggrandizement (Bermeo, 2016). Pakistan illustrates a different pattern: horizontal constraint without democratic deepening. Backsliding does not necessarily culminate in authoritarian closure; instead, it may stabilize into a hybrid equilibrium. This insight has broader applicability. Hybrid regimes with powerful unelected veto players, militaries, monarchies, or security elites, persist indefinitely if bargaining incentives remain intact. Regime change, therefore, requires disruption of the incentive structures underpinning bargains, not merely electoral reform.

6.4 Policy Implications

For policymakers and reform advocates, the findings caution against overreliance on elections, judicial reforms, or civilian turnover as pathways to democratization. In bargain-driven hybrid regimes, such interventions are often absorbed into the existing equilibrium. Effective reform must instead target:

- Economic autonomy of veto players, reducing off-budget rents and corporate interests;
 - Civilian capacity building, enabling collective bargaining rather than elite-level accommodation;
 - Transparency of security governance, narrowing the scope of informal veto power.
- Absent such changes, reforms risk reproducing hybridity rather than dismantling it.

6.5 Limitations and Future Research

This study focuses primarily on elite-level dynamics and formal institutions. Future research could examine how societal actors; media, judiciary, and civil society, interact with bargain-driven hybridity. Comparative extensions to cases

such as Egypt, Thailand, or Myanmar would further test the generalizability of the model. Quantitative operationalization of bargaining cycles also remains a promising avenue.

Conclusion

The endurance of civil-military bargains in Pakistan is rooted in a constellation of structural conditions that together sustain what this article conceptualizes as bargain-driven hybridity. At the core of this arrangement lies a professionalized and cohesive military institution endowed with substantial economic autonomy through military-run enterprises. This autonomy insulates the armed forces from effective civilian oversight and entrenches their role as a permanent veto player across security, foreign policy, and key economic domains. Civilian political parties, by contrast, remain weakly institutionalized, highly fragmented, and predominantly dynastic, lacking the organizational capacity or ideological cohesion necessary to collectively challenge military prerogatives. Judicial and bureaucratic institutions further reinforce this equilibrium by routinely legitimizing informal accommodations, thereby extending civil-military bargains into the formal architecture of governance.

International factors compound these domestic dynamics. Sustained geopolitical rents from major external partners reduce the military's dependence on domestic accountability, reinforcing its autonomy and buffering it from internal political pressures. Together, these structural conditions differentiate Pakistan sharply from comparative cases such as Turkey, Russia, Bangladesh, and Venezuela. In those cases, civil-military bargains either collapsed into civilian dominance, were absorbed into authoritarian closure, remained episodic and crisis-driven, or facilitated authoritarian entrenchment. Pakistan diverges by institutionalizing bargains as recurrent and routinized mechanisms of governance, rather than transitional or exceptional arrangements. The comparative analysis underscores that civil-military bargains do not produce uniform regime outcomes. Instead, they function variably across hybrid regimes as transitional devices, absorptive

strategies, episodic interventions, or instruments of authoritarian consolidation. Pakistan's distinctiveness lies in the durability of its bargaining equilibrium: bargains neither resolve nor disappear but are continuously renegotiated, reproducing hybridity across electoral cycles and political crises. This study therefore challenges linear models of democratization and democratic backsliding, demonstrating that hybrid regimes can persist not despite elite bargaining, but because such bargains become institutionalized. Hybrid regime endurance, in this view, rests less on coercion or democratic erosion alone than on the routinization of negotiated power-sharing between civilian elites and entrenched veto players.

References

- Abbasi, W. (2021, October 13). *PM Imran, army at odds over new ISI chief*. The News International.
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/899816>
- Aberbach, J. D., & Rockman, B. A. (2002). Conducting and coding elite interviews. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 35(4), 673-676.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S104909650201142>
- Adeney, K. (2017). How to understand Pakistan's hybrid regime: The importance of a multidimensional analysis. *Democratization*, 24(1), 119-137.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1159551>
- Barany, Z. (2012). *The soldier and the changing state: Building democratic armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*. Princeton University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691157994.001.0001>
- Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 5-19.
<https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012>

- Bogaards, M. (2009). How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism. *Democratization*, 16(2), 399–423. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340902777800>
- Capoccia, G., & Kelemen, R. D. (2007). The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism. *World Politics*, 59(3), 341–369. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100020852>
- Carothers, T. (2002). The end of the transition paradigm. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(1), 5–21. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0003>
- Cassani, A. (2014). Hybrid what? Partial conceptualization of hybrid regimes and new measures of democracy. *International Political Science Review*, 35(5), 542–558. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512114524454>
- Collier, D., & Levitsky, S. (1997). Democracy with adjectives: Conceptual innovation in comparative research. *World Politics*, 49(3), 430–451. <https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.1997.0009>
- Corrales, J., & Penfold, M. (2011). *Dragon in the tropics: Hugo Chávez and the political economy of revolution in Venezuela*. Brookings Institution Press.
- Croissant, A., & Kameron, J. (2013). Why do military regimes institutionalize? Constitution-making and elections as regime survival strategies in authoritarian regimes. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 21(2), 147–177. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2013.823793>
- Croissant, A., Kuehn, D., Chambers, P., & Wolf, S. (2013). *Democracy under stress: Civil-military relations in South and Southeast Asia*. Gadjah Mada University Press.
- Denzin, N. K. (1978). *The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods*. McGraw-Hill.
- DeVotta, N. (2016). Illiberalism and ethno-religious nationalism in Sri Lanka. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 84–98. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0006>
- Diamond, L. (2002). Thinking about hybrid regimes. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2), 21–35. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0025>
- Fair, C. C. (2022). Pakistan's hybrid democracy and the fall of Imran Khan. *Current History*, 121(835), 162–167. <https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2022.121.835.162>
- Fair, C. C. (2023). Civil-military relations and the fragility of hybrid regimes in Pakistan: The case of the PTI government (2018–2022). *Asian Survey*, 63(2), 345–368. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.63.2.345>
- Freedom House. (2023). *Freedom in the World 2023: Pakistan*. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/pakistan/freedom-world/2023>
- Gandhi, J., & Lust-Okar, E. (2009). Elections under authoritarianism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12(1), 403–422. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060106.095434>
- Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2006). Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships. *Economics & Politics*, 18(1), 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00160.x>
- Gel'man, V. (2015). *Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing post-Soviet regime changes*. University of Pittsburgh Press.
- George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. MIT Press.
- Gerring, J. (2007). *Case study research: Principles and practices*. Cambridge University Press.
- Haqqani, H. (2020). *Pakistan's Afghanistan policy: Emerging dilemmas*. Hudson Institute.
- Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political order in changing societies*. Yale University Press.

- International Crisis Group. (2018). *Pakistan's elections: Managing competing expectations* (Asia Report No. 302). <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/302-pakistans-elections-managing-competing-expectations>
- Jaffrelot, C. (2021). *Modi's India: Hindu nationalism and the rise of ethnic democracy*. Princeton University Press.
- Jalal, A. (1995). *Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia: A comparative and historical perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jalal, A. (2014). *The struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim homeland and global politics*. Harvard University Press.
- Kugelman, M. (2022, March 2). *Pakistan's awkward Russia embrace*. Foreign Policy. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/02/pakistan-russia-imran-khan-ukraine/>
- Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2010). *Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511781353>
- Lewis, D. (2011). *Bangladesh: Politics, economy and civil society*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511776728>
- Lührmann, A., & Lindberg, S. I. (2019). A third wave of autocratization is here. *Democratization*, 26(7), 1095–1113. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029>
- Munck, G. L., & Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(1), 5–34. <https://doi.org/10.1177/001041400203500101>
- Özbudun, E. (2015). Turkey's judiciary and the drift toward competitive authoritarianism. *The International Spectator*, 50(2), 42–55. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2015.1020650>
- Rafiq, A. (2021, July 20). *Military Inc. 2.0: The new hybrid regime in Pakistan*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/07/20/military-inc-2.0-new-hybrid-regime-in-pakistan-pub-84925>
- Riaz, A. (2019). More than meets the eye: Bangladesh's democratic backsliding. *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, 42(2), 257–275. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2019.1575052>
- Rizvi, H. A. (2000). *Military, state and society in Pakistan*. Macmillan.
- Rumi, R. (2019). Pakistan's 2018 elections and hybrid democracy. *Asian Survey*, 59(6), 959–980. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2019.59.6.959>
- Saldaña, J. (2013). *The coding manual for qualitative researchers* (2nd ed.). Sage.
- Schedler, A. (2013). *The politics of uncertainty: Sustaining and subverting electoral authoritarianism*. Oxford University Press.
- Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case selection techniques in case study research. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), 294–308. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077>
- Shah, A. (2014). *The army and democracy: Military politics in Pakistan*. Harvard University Press.
- Siddiqi, A. (2007). *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's military economy*. Pluto Press.
- Slater, D. (2010). *Ordering power: Contentious politics and authoritarian leviathans in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge University Press.
- Stepan, A. (1988). *Rethinking military politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton University Press.
- Trinkunas, H. (2015). *Crafting civilian control of the military in Venezuela: A comparative perspective*. University of North Carolina Press.

- Waldner, D., & Lust, E. (2018). Unwelcome change. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 21(1), 93–113. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628>
- Wood, E. J. (2006). The ethical challenges of field research in conflict zones. *Qualitative Sociology*, 29(3), 373–386. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11133-006-9027-8>
- Yilmaz, G. (2018). The AKP and the military. *Turkish Studies*, 19(2), 221–239. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1408172>
- Yusuf, M. (2022). Pakistan's political crisis and the military's role. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/12/pakistan-s-political-crisis-and-military-s-role>
- Yusuf, M. (2022). The crisis of governance in Pakistan. *Journal of South Asian Development*, 17(2), 131–149. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09731741221100986>

