

UNDERSTANDING THE BASIS OF AFGHANISTAN POLITICAL SYSTEM BETWEEN 2001 AND 2021

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Abstract

This qualitative study, based on secondary data, explores the political system of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021. Following the Bonn Agreement of 2001, Afghanistan adopted a democratic framework, formally established through a new constitution that outlined the roles and responsibilities of state institutions. Central to this system was the electoral process, with four presidential elections and multiple rounds of national assembly, provincial, district, and municipal elections conducted during this period. The president functioned as both head of state and government, leading the cabinet and appointing ministers, who required parliamentary approval. The study concludes that despite challenges, the political structure during these two decades was fundamentally rooted in democratic principles.

INTRODUCTION

Research objectives:

This research aims to understand the base of political system in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2021. The research focuses to understand the process of elections and its impact on democratic processes in the country. It also give information about the structure of Afghanistan national assembly and its duties and responsibilities.

Research methodology

This is a qualitative research based on secondary data. It used books, articles, newspaper and academic journals for understanding of the basic of the topic, literature review and theoretical underpinnings.

Defining Democracy:

People around the world have defined democracy in their own contexts, according to the way they perceived societies and democratic systems. The

world these days has several types of democracy. People and societies have applied their own version of democracy according to the social contexts they witness. As we use the term "democracy" in this entry, it refers very broadly to a system of group decision-making that is defined by a degree of equality among the participants at a crucial point in the decision-making process.

Democracy is concerned with collective decision-making, which we define as decisions made for groups and intended to be binding on all group members. Secondly, we want this term to encompass all of the many organizations and democratic decision-making processes that might be referred to. The depth of equality required by the notion of democracy may vary. One person, one vote may only be a formal equality in elections for representatives to a parliament where there is competition among candidates. Or it might be stronger, incorporating

real equality in the decision-making and coalition-building procedures that precede the vote. Any of these political systems may be referred to as "democracy." The members of a society may directly vote on the laws and policies that govern that society, or they may choose to participate in the decision-making process through electing representatives (Sameer Bajaj and Tom Christiano 2006).

The Bonn Conference produced a road map for the construction of a temporary political structure in late 2001 following a US military effort to drive Taliban forces out of Afghanistan. This temporary political framework served as the foundation for long-term, democratic state institutions. A commission established in the wake of the Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002–2003 produced a new constitution after the Taliban were initially driven from power. The new constitution, which replaced the monarch as head of state, was based on Afghanistan's constitution of 1964 but included several modifications, such as a clause guaranteeing seats for women in parliament and provisions governing the president's authority. Many people regarded the 2004 presidential election as a historically significant political and technological success. Afghans recently emerged from a bloody conflict, making signs of a smooth and well-organized election even more impressive. This was the country's first time electing a head of state, and it appeared to be successful on the surface (Larson, Democracy in Afghanistan: July, 2021)

Elections and Democracy:

The majority of definitions of elections consider them to be an essential component of democratic politics—a means of institutionalizing political equality by providing individuals with the opportunity to regularly cast equal votes for a potential representative of their choice or, for others, a venue for contestation for governmental office. In theory, elections are held to measure popular support for particular individuals in order to establish a government that is representative, or as representative as possible, and is held accountable by subsequent elections. This, according to some academics like Robert Dahl, is the only feasible strategy for expanding democratic politics to the national level. Elections are typically held on a regular basis to ensure that individuals are subject to

the competitive gaining or regaining of public confidence through the popular vote.

This is done to counterbalance the potential monopolization of power that could result from such a system. This, according to political scientist Adam Przeworski, has the effect of "institutionalizing uncertainty" in that those in public office have to deal with the possibility of limits on how long they can stay in office. The ability of ordinary voters to limit the authority of those in the office is at the heart of most conceptions of democracy, so this has the effect of "institutionalizing uncertainty." (Larson, Noah Coburn and Anna, 2013).

A crucial component of democratic governance is elections. Democratic government must be carried out through representatives because direct democracy—a type of government in which political choices are made directly by the complete body of qualified citizens—is unworkable in the majority of contemporary cultures. Elections give citizens the opportunity to choose their leaders and hold them responsible for their actions while in government. Accountability can be harmed by elected officials who do not care if they are reelected or by a party or coalition that is so strong that voters have little to no choice among alternative candidates, parties, or policies due to historical factors or other factors. However, the ability to maintain control over leaders by compelling them to participate in regular elections helps to address the issue of leadership succession and so supports the survival of democracy. Elections also act as platforms for the discussion of public issues and help promote the expression of public opinion where the electoral process is competitive and pushes candidates or parties to expose their histories and future intentions to public scrutiny. Citizens can learn about politics through elections, which also guarantee that democratic governments will act in accordance with the wishes of the populace. Additionally, they serve to legitimate the actions of individuals in positions of authority, a role that is partially filled even by noncompetitive elections (Heinz Eulau, Roger Gibbins and Paul David Webb, 2020).

The political community's stability and legitimacy are also bolstered by elections. Elections connect citizens to one another, confirming the viability of the polity in the same way that national holidays commemorate

experiences shared by all. Elections, as a result, aid in social and political integration.

Lastly, elections confirm the worth and dignity of individual citizens as human beings, which serves a purpose of self-actualization. Voters' self-esteem and self-respect are bolstered when they participate in an election, regardless of any other requirements they may have. People have the opportunity to express their opinions and satisfy their need to feel a sense of belonging by voting. Some people feel the need to express their alienation from the political community even if they don't vote. The long struggle for the right to vote and the demand for equal electoral participation can be seen as manifestations of a deep human desire for personal fulfillment precisely for these reasons (Katz, 1997).

Democracy in Afghanistan:

After 2001, Afghanistan did not establish any new modern democratic institutions—more specifically, elected representatives and the elections held to select them. Indeed, there have been numerous attempts to "modernize" politics in accordance with democratic principles in the past: Amanullah Khan established a parliament in the late 1920s, and successive elections for parliamentary seats were held in the 1960s and 1980s under the Soviet-backed People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The Constitution of Afghanistan formed during the post-Taliban Bonn Process was based on Zahir Shah's "era of democracy," and the successive parliaments of 1965-1969 and 1969-1971 functioned in a manner very similar to the way the current parliament operates. As a result, it is completely erroneous to believe that the so-called Bonn Process took place against a blank slate. In fact, many of the institutions that emerged during the formation of post-Taliban Afghanistan are actually continuations or developments of versions that were much earlier.

After the military invasion in 2001, state-building initiatives led by international actors were supported by new rhetoric of democratization. The first presidential elections in the country were held in 2004 following the establishment of a transitional and then interim government led by Hamid Karzai.

Although the official declaration of a free and fair election was not entirely consistent with the perceptions of many Afghans, who were first-hand

witnesses to the fraud that occurred the accomplishment was nonetheless impressive. These elections were largely an international exercise that was coordinated by the Joint Elections Management Body (JEMB), and they were hailed as a great success at the time. There was a turnout of almost 80% across the entire country. In 2005, elections for the provincial council (PC) and parliament followed, with a relatively high turnout once more. The four-year Bonn Process, which was intended to be "a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic, and fully representative government," came to an end with parliament's inauguration in November 2005.

The Walasi Jirga, or lower house of parliament, has finished its first full term since then, and a new parliament has just been inaugurated.

Numerous short-term, donor-funded programs have accompanied these events. These have attempted to provide technical assistance to promoting various aspects of a "democratization" agenda that encourage the strengthening of civil society, the promotion of women's rights and gender equality, the consolidation of political parties, and attempting to establish mechanisms of subnational governance. These have typically been implemented either before or after an election. However, these have remained largely superficial engagements and have been undermined in numerous ways by international actors' preference for dealing with elected bodies rather than the executive. In one respect, their character highlights how the international community's stated commitment to promoting democratization was not accompanied by adherence to the principles of accountability that had been discussed during elections. However, they also demonstrate a few of the fundamental assumptions that have served as the foundation for democratization efforts—more specifically, the holding of elections—which are discussed in greater detail further down (Larson, *Deconstructing Democracy in Afghanistan* 2011).

In light of the fact that a lot has changed in ten years and a new set of factors are at play, democratization concerns in Afghanistan must also be taken into account in the present setting. Over the course of this time, security has significantly decreased, and the number of areas under insurgent control has

increased. In addition, the ongoing context of insecurity in which there is neither outright war nor consolidated peace has created substantial opportunities for the enrichment of powerful elites. This has contributed to a dramatic turnaround in general perceptions of the Karzai government, which is now bitterly resented by many. These three factors raised serious doubts about the capability, legitimacy, and political will of institutions ostensibly designed to promote the advancement of a democratic agenda in the country. The fact that attention is diverted to stabilization efforts and not paid to how donor funds are actually spent has allowed certain key public figures to accumulate vast wealth. They put the long-term viability of the democratization process as a whole in jeopardy by doing so (Coburn 2010).

A Short History of Elections in Afghanistan:

Although some analysts are of the opinion that the 2004 and 2005 elections as the first steps toward an Afghan democracy following the international intervention in 2001, precedents still existed: previous elections, in addition to a tradition of community consultation in the selection of leaders that influenced the outcome of the polls. Preceding 2004, generally, free parliamentary surveys had occurred in 1949, with the foundation of the purported Liberal Parliament (1949-1952). Later, in 1964 and again in 1969, under Zahir Shah's reforms and a new constitution, parliamentary elections were held during what is sometimes referred to as the "decade of democracy" (1963-1973).

In 1973, a coup led by Mohammed Dawood Khan, a cousin of the king and former prime minister, ended the constitutional monarchy and declared the beginning of the Republic, ending this fledgling electoral cycle. Although the fully participatory election for a national leader in Afghanistan in 2004 was the first, it was not the first election for many older Afghans, as mentioned above (Larson, Noah Coburn and Anna, 2013).

A number of elections have been held since the middle of 2004 among Afghans: as presidential in 2004; In 2005, Walasi Jirga, the lower house of the National Assembly, and the Provincial Council, which represents 34 provinces, Walasi Jirga in 2010 and the Presidential and Provincial Council in 2009. Additionally, each of the 34 Provincial Councils

elects two-thirds of the upper house of the National Assembly (the Meshrano Jirga) and the president appoints one-third as a result of the Provincial Council events. In 2004, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) conducted out-of-country voting (OCV) for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Afghanistan for the presidential election; this did not occur again at any subsequent events (Campbell, 2018).

As a result of widespread mistrust of political parties associated with the Communist and civil war eras, a misunderstanding of the implications of having a single vote for individual candidates in large multi-member constituencies, and a possible executive strategy to limit the emergence of organized opposition, SNTV's birth in Afghanistan was initially something of an accident. A provincially based list PR system was proposed by the United Nations in 2004 as the best option for Afghan Walasi Jirga elections; however, the rules were reportedly not adopted correctly when they were presented to the cabinet. President Karzai changed the proposed provincially-based list PR system to SNTV by simply stating that voters would select a candidate rather than a party, list, or block, and that candidates could not show party affiliation on the ballot after the UN-crafted proportional electoral system was poorly explained by an Afghan cabinet minister. According to the 2004 electoral law, voters will still be able to choose between individual candidates rather than parties in the multi-member provincial constituencies that were initially intended for use in the list-PR system (Andrew Reynolds and John Carey, 2012).

The constitution and the Electoral Law serve as the Independent Election Commission, Independent election commission legal foundation. Citizens "shall have the right to elect and be elected," according to Article 33, and the "Independent Election Commission shall be established to administer as well as supervise every kind of election" is spelled out in Article 156. Three electoral laws have been passed, all of which were made by presidential decree: 2004, 2005, and 2010 (when the ECC provisions were made). The INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION is also impacted by a number of additional decrees and adjunct laws, such as the Political Parties Law of 2009 (Campbell, 2018)

Since 2004, the president has been elected through a two-round, direct, majoritarian process in which all voters cast a single vote for a single candidate who does not need to be a member of a party; Whoever receives "50 percent + 1" of the votes is the winner. A runoff between the two front-runners is called if no candidate succeeds. The single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system was chosen for the first parliamentary and provincial council elections. In multimember constituencies (provinces), like in presidential elections, all voters cast one vote for a single candidate. Each province has a set number of seats based on population. The number of candidates who can put themselves forward is unlimited: Again, no candidate is required to run on a party ticket; the candidates who receive the most votes win the seats that are available (Larson, Democracy in Afghanistan: July, 2021).

There are Thirty-four provinces and a nationwide constituency for the country's nomadic communities, the kuchis, are the thirty-five multimember electoral constituencies in which each voter casts a single vote for a single candidate to elect their representatives for Walasi Jirga. Article 83 of the constitution stipulates that at least one seat must be reserved for female candidates in each constituency (for a total of at least sixty-eight seats nationwide)—an exception to this general rule that allows female candidates to win seats with fewer votes than their male counterparts.

Afghanistan's elections are managed by the Independent election commission. In 2009, strong allegations were made about the Independent election commission lack of impartiality, and this became a common and prevalent belief, particularly after reports about "extensive" election fraud committed by Independent election commission staff were made public. It was anticipated that the Afghanistan-led Commission would instill a sense of Afghan ownership of the process; however, due to their ethnicity, many Afghans lacked faith in the commissioners' impartiality.

In the months leading up to the elections in 2010, the Independent election commission expended a significant amount of time and effort responding to such allegations and defending its reputation; however, it was unable to effectively respond to all demands because some of them were beyond the independent election commission means and/or

authority (ensuring security, registering emigrant Afghans for elections).

Another arbitrator was brought in because of the ECC's weakness and inability to act as a watchdog: the Attorney General's Office, which was contacted by a lot of candidates who felt powerless and were encouraged to get involved by the president, who was unhappy with the results of the parliamentary elections. The Principal legal officer's Office subsequently began exploring independent election commission and ECC staff. The main issue is that there is no body with the authority and credibility to mediate or make the final decision in the dispute, which is still ongoing.

National observers were also important players because they could travel to areas that were more dangerous than international observers could. These were the candidates' representatives. One issue was that there was no limit on the number of such agents, so candidates with more money had more people on the ground. On Election Day there were arguments because the polling stations in some urban centers did not have enough space for all of the agents. FEFA was the main independent national observation group, and it covered about 60% of all polling locations. In terms of observing the process, FEFA played an important and courageous role. However, it cannot be ignored that some FEFA employees were either bought out or replaced by powerful candidates (Shaharзад Akbar and Zubaida Akbar, 2011).

Democratization and the role of elections in Afghanistan:

The Bush administration's "light footprint" strategy necessitated putting elections ahead of building a more democratic culture in the early stages of the US intervention in Afghanistan. Rather than constructing democracy, the objective was to hold elections and appoint a new government.

The link between elections, democratization, and accountability is even less straightforward than is frequently recognized and, in the case of Afghanistan, relies on a trio of shaky assumptions, despite the fact that many analysts and practitioners of democratization in conflict-affected states acknowledge the difficulties and contradictions involved in establishing democratic processes. First,

it assumes that public outrage will be strong enough to prevent the leaders in question from running for reelection and that they are using public money—taxes—to enrich themselves. The renter state of Afghanistan avoids this outrage in large part by wasting aid funds rather than collecting taxes. Second, it assumes that elite negotiations will not overrule the election outcome. Thirdly, it presupposes that enhancing the electoral process would benefit all parties.

Since 2004, it has become abundantly clear that democracy and elections have at best a tenuous connection. This is due, in part, to the fact that the United States' influence, which has had a significant impact on the outcomes of elections, has complicated the supposedly straightforward political agreement between the Afghan people and their government. This influence has been felt not only in the general sense of the ongoing military occupation, but also in more specific ways, such as pressuring Karzai to run for president in 2004, having US ambassadors visit opposition candidates ahead of the presidential election in 2009 to try to keep Karzai from running, brokering the negotiations that resulted in the formation of the National Unity Government in 2014, and downplaying the significance of the elections in 2019 due to simultaneous peace talks with the Taliban that did not include the Afghan government. There has been some form of US involvement that has altered the process in every presidential election. "Elections were never resolved by the counting of votes, they were always resolved by the US," stated one expert interviewed for this study. What Scott Smith refers to as the "de-sovereignization" of Afghan elections has resulted from this. Sovereignisation is the process or state of being independent. Elections are not democratic if they are not sovereign (Greene, 2009). However, Afghanistan's democracy was understood, accepted, and appropriate due to three factors. First, the willingness of Afghan citizens to participate in and shoulder what they perceive as their duty to select their leaders is demonstrated by relatively high turnouts of over 50% of the registered electorate in the majority of elections. This is bolstered by the long history of communities negotiating with the state through carefully chosen intermediaries and the widespread consensus cultures that make it possible

for communities to participate in politics at the local and national levels.

Second, democratic politics was the modernization strategy chosen by the Afghan monarchy and the elites that surrounded it at various points in the 20th century. Democracy has never been viewed as an alien imposition in Afghanistan in and of itself. After 2001, some Afghans began to associate the English term "democracy" with a kind of secular anarchy in which immoral behavior was permitted in the imposition of un-Islamic cultural values by the invading US forces. However, the principle of public participation in selecting leaders was never rejected or disregarded. Thirdly, the vibrancy of Afghanistan's media and the relative freedom of its press spoke volumes about the suitability of democracy as a political system (and the unlikelihood of any other system taking hold). As long as it was implemented within an Islamic framework the community selection of leaders was fully understood and welcomed. Despite numerous threats to the safety of journalists, candid reviews of government programs and policies and reports of government and Taliban misconduct frequently appear in print and online media. In addition, the fact that the 2009 Mass Media Law remains unchanged despite numerous government attempts to amend it, as well as the history of political organizations with well-known publications, indicated that urban, literate Afghans continue to want to interact more with the state and hold it accountable (Larson, Democracy in Afghanistan: Amid conflict and beyond 2021).

Legislative Structure in Afghanistan:

Under Nadir Shah's rule, the 1931 Constitution established the first Afghan parliament. Despite the fact that suffrage was granted to all males over the age of 20, its members were largely chosen by the government, and its role was limited to ratifying laws. Even though elections were still controlled by the government, the Seventh Parliament, which was elected in 1949, was dubbed a "liberal parliament," and the Eighth Parliament, which followed, was marked by significantly more government control. As the institution developed, it became increasingly an arena for the expression of opposition to the ruling monarchy under Nadir's son Zahir.

Under State leader Dawood's heading, somewhere in the range of 1953 and 1963, move to suppress restricting voices was made, compelling beginning political gatherings underground and removing from parliament candid government pundits. Before parliamentary elections allowed women to vote and run for office for the first time. Before Dawood's 1973 coup d'état, elections were held in 1965 and 1969, and parliament was replaced with the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's (PDPA) Central Committee in 1979. The fourteenth parliament, which was established during the Bonn Process over three decades later, set institutional precedents for the Afghan legislature during the 1960s and early 1970s, despite its brief lifespan (Larson, House of the people? Afghanistan's parliament in 2015 2016)

With Islam as the state religion, the new Afghan Constitution declared Afghanistan to be an "Islamic Republic." "No law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam," the Constitution further states. The Afghan state must also "abide by the UN charter, international treaties, international conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," according to Article 7 of the new constitution. The new Afghan Constitution provided for the separation of powers under a presidential system, a strong executive, a bicameral legislature, and a judiciary, and established a democratic regime. During nationwide elections in October 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. September 2005 saw elections for legislators (Fleschenberg 2009).

National assembly

According to article 81 of the constitution, the national assembly is the highest legislative body and is responsible for public welfare and people's representation. The combination of the national assembly follows immediately after, as stated in article 82, which states that the national assembly has two parts (Bi-cameral). Walesi Jirga and Meshrano Jirga are the lower and upper houses of parliament.

According to article 3 of the constitution, the members of the Walesi Jirga are chosen by direct election, in which each voter has the right to cast a single vote and no one can force anyone else to vote for them. For elections, a single, non-transferable

vote system is acceptable. Walesi Jirga members cannot be chosen by both houses of the national assembly. The elections for the lower house of the parliament should take place sixty days before the Walesi Jirga's five-year term ends, as stipulated by the constitution. Each province's number of Walesi Jirga members is determined by its population, geographical location, and other factors. The individuals from the Walesi Jirga ought not to be more than 250.

The requirements for those who want to be members of the national assembly are outlined in Article 85 of the constitution.

1. Ten years prior to their candidacy, Afghan or earned their identity in Afghanistan.
2. Have not been denied their fundamental rights and have not been labeled a criminal by the court.
3. On Election Day, 25 years old.

To be elected as a member of the national assembly, each individual should meet the aforementioned requirements.

The chief of each house of the national assembly is chosen through internal voting, and each house of the national assembly is required to (and).

The responsibilities of the national assembly

The authority of the national assembly is as follows:

- Creating, amending, and terminating the orders and laws.
- The presentation of programs for social, cultural, economic, and technological development.
- Articulation of the state budget and allowances for the establishment and removal of national administrative organs.
- Rejecting Afghanistan's inclusion in an international agreement.
- A few different obligations as indicated by the constitution.

There are two chambers in the National Assembly: the Walasi Jirga or "House of People" and the Meshrano Jirga or "House of Elders."

Non-Pashtun ethnic groups and political independents can now effectively oppose or influence the president through the National Assembly. Although many observers maintain that it has not been able to subvert presidential authority, the Assembly was established by the constitution as a

relatively powerful body that can, to some extent, check the president's powers.

Article 92 grants the lower house the authority to pass a motion of no confidence against ministers upon a proposal from 10 percent of the lower house's 25 members. Legislation must be passed by both houses, the upper and lower. The national budget is discussed first by the Meshrano Jirga and then by the Walasi Jirga in accordance with Article 98 of the constitution. A National Assembly "secretariat" manages a research unit and a library for the two houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of Finance. The National Assembly "secretariat" employs approximately 275 Afghans. 18 oversight committees exist. The Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project (APAP) was a USAID program that helped the National Assembly improve its outreach, communications, and information technology, as well as advised it on budgeting and legislative reform. The National Assembly has frequently demonstrated institutional power. Reviewing, approving, amending, or nullifying presidential decrees issued prior to the formation of the National Assembly was one of the Assembly's first responsibilities. It was approved by a vote in March 2006 to require approval of each cabinet member separately rather than collectively, giving the opposition more leverage. However, of the initial 25 nominees, all but 5 were confirmed.

The Assembly's institutional strength was confirmed by the second-term cabinet confirmation process, in which many of Karzai's nominees were rejected in multiple nomination rounds in 2010. Later, in August 2012, it voted out Interior Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi and Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak, allegedly for failing to reduce corruption in their respective ministries. Despite Karzai's subsequent appointment and confirmation of Khan as defense minister, he complied with the vote. The lower house summoned 11 ministers in January 2013 to explain why they had only carried out approximately half of their budgetary authority in 2012. The lower house questioned Finance Minister Omar Zakhilwal about allegations that a number of parliamentarians were smuggling goods across Afghanistan's borders in the middle of May 2013, but it decided not to impeach him. In July 2013, the lower house rejected Interior Minister

Ghulam Mujtaba Patang with a vote of no confidence due to security breaches throughout Afghanistan. Karzai initially objected to the move, but he eventually gave in toward the end of August 2013 and appointed Umar Daudzai (see above) as Interior Minister. In spite of the controversy surrounding the presidential election in 2014, the National Assembly passed a number of pending laws. It enacted a law against money laundering and a law against commercial contracts. A mining and minerals law, a value-added tax law, and an "access to information" law were also enacted by the lower house (Katzman, 2014).

Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders:

The "upper" house of parliament is the Meshrano Jirga. It is the more vulnerable of the two bodies, and is in a roundabout way chosen. The provincial councils choose 34 members, one from each province, from among their own members, to serve four-year terms. Each province's district councils select 34 additional members for three-year terms from among their own members. The president appoints the remaining 34 members for five-year terms, and half of these individuals must be women. However, district council elections for Meshrano Jirga members did not take place in 2005 (Guinn, 2014).

Walasi Jirga (WJ) House of People:

Walasi Jirga, or the House of the People (Pashto: The lower house of the Afghanistan's bicameral National Assembly (also known as the House of Elders and abbreviated as WJ) is Similar to the House of Commons in the Westminster model, the House of the People is the chamber that is responsible for making the majority of the country's laws. It comprises 249 delegates straightforwardly chosen by a single non-adaptable vote (SNTV).

Members are elected for a term of five years and are elected by district. The constitution stipulates that at least 64 of the delegates must be women. Through a Single National Constituency, the nomadic Kuchi elects ten representatives. The primary authority for enacting laws, ratifying them, and approving the president's actions is the House of the People. Four years after the Taliban regime was overthrown, in September 2005, the first elections in decades were

held while still under international supervision (primarily from NATO and the United Nations). On September 18, 2010, the elections for the Walasi Jirga were held (Sladojevic 2019).

The Walasi Jirga, which consists of no more than 250 members (the electoral law of 2004 set the house's size at 249 members), is the more powerful of the two houses of parliament. Five-year terms are directly elected for each member. Each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces receives two seats in the House of Representatives, proportional to their population. 68 female representatives—twice as many as there are provinces—are required by the Constitution, and each province is required to have at least one female representative by the 2004 electoral law. A single, non-transferable vote system was used in the 2005 elections, with each individual casting a single vote for a single candidate in their province. Parliament was filled with the candidates with the most votes from each province. No party lists existed in 2005, and all candidates ran as independents; however, a few of the candidates belonged to or were supported by political parties. Over eighty registered political parties exist at the moment. In new democracies, such a large number is not unusual (Fleschenberg, 2009).

Regulation can start in either the president's consent, and the proposition should initially be brought into the Walasi Jirga. On the off chance that it is supported by the Walasi Jirga, it is sent onto the Meshrano Jirga for endorsement. A Walasi Jirga majority of two-thirds can override the proposed law if the Meshrano Jirga rejects it. A Walasi Jirga majority of two-thirds can also override a presidential veto.

Conclusion

This secondary data based qualitative study focused on the understanding of the fundamental of Afghanistan Political system started from 2001 and ended in 2021. Based on the study of the existed data on the topic we get to the result that the political system of Afghanistan was based on democracy. This system was accepted in Bonn agreement signed in 2001 by the leadership of Afghanistan to make a road and map for the future Afghanistan political system. The constitution which was written that time clearly mentioned the

responsibilities and authorities of every part of the system. The focus of the democratic system in every country is on the process of elections. In these 21 years Afghanistan has done four rounds of presidential election and several time the elections for national assembly. As there were many other elections for electing the members of district and provincial council also election for the leadership of the Kabul municipality and for other councils which was established that time. The president was named as the leader of the government and the leader of the state and nation as well. He was leading the cabinet of Afghanistan and has the authority to name the ministers for the ministries and after that every minister has to gain the majority of the national assembly vote to be known as the minister.

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