CIVIL–MILITARY BARGAINS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF HYBRID REGIMES: EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN

Abstract

Hybrid regimes are often conceptualized as transitional political arrangements, yet many display remarkable durability. This article investigates why hybrid regimes persist despite recurrent elections and periodic alternation in office. It argues that Pakistan’s political order is sustained through recurring civil–military bargains that generate reciprocal benefits: civilian leaders secure access to power and electoral legitimacy, while the military preserves veto authority over security, foreign policy, and key economic domains. Drawing on documentary evidence and elite interviews, the analysis demonstrates how these bargains initially stabilized party-based rule but later fragmented, producing regime reconfiguration rather than democratic consolidation. The article advances the concept of bargain-driven hybridity, emphasizing negotiation rather than coercion alone as a central mechanism underpinning regime persistence. Comparative insights from Turkey, Russia, Bangladesh, and Venezuela illustrate how civil-military bargains evolve differently across hybrid regimes, highlighting Pakistan’s distinctiveness in sustaining such arrangements as cyclical equilibria. These findings challenge linear models of democratization and democratic backsliding, showing that hybrid regimes can consolidate as durable political settlements. The policy implications suggest that democratic reform efforts must address the incentive structures sustaining civil–military bargains if meaningful democratic consolidation is to become feasible.