CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM AND PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY IN PAKISTAN AFTER THE 18TH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE

Abstract

The 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010) represents a landmark transformation in the federal structure of Pakistan, shifting the governance system from a centralized model toward enhanced provincial autonomy and constitutional federalism. This study examines the implications of the amendment for democratic governance and institutional balance within Pakistan’s federal framework. Grounded in Fiscal Federalism Theory, the study employs a quantitative, explanatory research design using survey data from 320 respondents drawn from federal and provincial governance institutions. Data were analyzed using SPSS and SmartPLS through regression and Structural Equation Modeling techniques. The findings reveal that the 18th Amendment has a significant positive impact on provincial autonomy, fiscal decentralization, and democratic governance outcomes. However, institutional capacity and intergovernmental coordination emerge as critical moderating factors that limit the full effectiveness of devolution. The study concludes that while constitutional reforms have strengthened formal federal structures, practical governance outcomes remain constrained by administrative inefficiencies and coordination gaps. This research contributes to federalism literature by providing empirical evidence on the post-reform governance structure of Pakistan and offers policy insights for strengthening cooperative federalism, institutional capacity, and decentralized governance.