AFGHANISTAN’S STRATEGIC CULTURE IN THE POST-9/11 ERA: CONTINUITY, ADAPTATION, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR

Abstract

This paper examines Afghanistan’s strategic behaviour in the post-9/11 era through the lens of Strategic Culture Theory. It argues that the collapse of the Afghan republic in 2021 and the return of the Taliban cannot be adequately explained by governance failure, military withdrawal, or material power dynamics alone. Instead, these developments reflect the persistence of a historically embedded strategic culture shaped by collective memory of resistance, tribal norms of authority, and culturally grounded legitimacy structures. Drawing on qualitative historical analysis, process tracing, and thematic interpretation of secondary literature and policy sources, the study demonstrates that post-9/11 external intervention altered institutional forms without transforming underlying strategic preferences. The paper shows that Taliban II governance, security practices, and external engagement patterns represent continuity and selective adaptation rather than rupture. By extending Strategic Culture Theory to the post-9/11 Afghan context, the study contributes to contemporary security studies. It offers policy-relevant insights into the limits of externally driven state-building and coercive security strategies in culturally resistant environments.