ALTRUISM, STRATEGIC VOTING, AND COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM PUBLIC CHOICE GAMES

Abstract

The paradox of voting where rational-choice theory predicts near-zero turnout in large elections due to negligible pivotality, yet millions consistently participate has prompted extensive research into the roles of altruism, strategic considerations, and institutional design in collective decision-making. This review synthesizes experimental evidence from laboratory public goods games, voter turnout experiments, and field studies of elections and referenda, alongside insights from neuroeconomics and agent-based modeling. Key findings demonstrate that other-regarding preferences (altruism, inequity aversion, warm-glow giving) significantly elevate turnout even when instrumental benefits are vanishingly small, with dictator-game variants and modified calculus-of-voting models showing altruism accounts for 30–60% of observed participation. Strategic voting sincere vs. tactical behavior, leader-follower dynamics, and coordination under incomplete information further modulates outcomes, particularly in multi-candidate or two-round systems. Institutional features (compulsory voting, expressive benefits, social norms, information provision via networks) interact with intrinsic motives to stabilize cooperative equilibria. Neuroeconomic studies reveal activation in reward and empathy-related brain regions during prosocial voting decisions, while computational simulations highlight how heterogeneous altruism and learning dynamics sustain turnout in large electorates. The synthesis reconciles apparent irrationality with persistent cooperation, underscoring that effective democratic design must harness both self-interest and other-regarding motivations to ensure robust civic engagement.