THE EMERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN PAKISTAN: RESTRUCTURING JUDICIAL POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

Abstract

This paper explores the role of the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments in reforming judicial power and constitutional adjudication in Pakistan, and how they have affected judicial independence, constitutional supremacy, and the balance of power among state institutions. This analysis will begin by explaining the pre-amendment status of the judiciary, in which the Supreme Court served as the main protector of the Constitution by reviewing its own decisions, appointing judges based on seniority, and exercising Suo motu power. The paper argues that, despite this model's drawbacks, particularly the persistent conflicts between the judiciary and the political branches, it has managed to retain a relatively cohesive system of constitutional checks and balances. It then reviews the 26th Amendment, noting four major changes: the tenure of the Chief Justice, the reconstitution of the Judicial Commission, the restriction of Suo motu powers, and the establishment of constitutional benches. The paper concludes that these reforms, though introduced to enhance institutional continuity, accountability, and specialization, also introduced political control over the appointment of judges and undermined the judiciary's independent checking role. The 27th Amendment was introduced as the next, more profound structural change, establishing the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) and removing the Supreme Court's constitutional preeminence. The study notes that this development created parallel apex courts, heightened the risk of conflicting constitutional interpretations, and weakened the judicial hierarchy. The study finds that the two amendments were packaged as efficiency-based reforms but, in reality, reshaped judicial power in ways that can jeopardize fair adjudication and expose the courts to indirect executive influence.